Prof. Martin Bichler
Lecture WS 19/20
Auction Theory and Market Design (IN2211)
Intended learning outcomes:
The field of market design studies how to construct rules for allocating resources or to structure successful marketplaces. It draws on the tools of game theory and mechanism design to identify why certain market rules or institutions succeed and why others fail. The field has become popular in the recent years with many applications in the sale of spectrum licenses, electricity markets, or the assignment of students to courses.
After participating in the course, the participants understand methods and game-theoretical models of auctions as well as the fundamental problems in the design of combinatorial auctions. They are able to assess the properties of different auction formats, and the results of theoretical and experimental analyses.
Prerequisites:
Students should be familiar with linear and integer optimization. The lecture on algorithmic game theory provides complementary concepts in game theory and related issues in complexity theory.
Syllabus:
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Lectures: Wednesdays, 14:00 - 17:30, TUM Department of Informatics, Garching-Forschungszentrum, MI Hörsaal 2 (00.04.011)
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Tutorial: Wednesdays, 17:30 - 19:30, TUM Department of Informatics, Garching-Forschungszentrum, MI Hörsaal 2 (00.04.011)
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Final exam: 16.01.2020, 18:30 - 20:00, Garching-Forschungszentrum, MW 0001, Gustav-Niemann-Hörsaal (5510.EG.001)
Topic Lecture Exercise An introduction to game theory 16.10. 23.10. Game theory and mechanism design 23.10. 30.10. Single-item auctions 30.10. 06.11. Combinatorial auctions 06.11. 13.11. Assignment markets 13.11. 20.11. Iterative combinatorial auctions 20.11. 27.11. Combinatorial clock auctions 27.11. 04.12. Approximation mechanisms 04.12. 11.12. Matching Markets 11.12. 18.12.
Organization:
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Slides: will be made available before each class in the eLearning plattform Moodle.
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Lecture registration opens on October 1st.
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Exercise registration opens after the first lecture on October 16th.
Literature:
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Lecture notes via Moodle.
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M. Bichler: Market Design - A Linear Programming Approach to Auctions and Matching. Cambridge University Press. Available online via the TUM library.
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Y. Shoham and K. Leyton-Brown: Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. Available as PDF at: http://www.masfoundations.org/mas.pdf (Chapters 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12)
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N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos and V. Vazirani (editors): Algorithmic Game Theory. Available as PDF at: https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~sandholm/cs15-892F13/algorithmic-game-theory.pdf(Chapters 9 and 11 by Nisan)
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V. Krishna: Auction Theory (Chapters 16 and 17 on multi-object auctions)
Contact:
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Room 01.10.058Phone: 289 - 17528E-Mail: schwarzg
in.tum.de