Dr. Stefan Waldherr
Lecture WS 17/18
Auction Theory and Market Design (IN2211)
Intended Learning outcomes:
The field of market design studies how to construct rules for allocating resources or to structure successful marketplaces. It draws on the tools of game theory and mechanism design to identify why certain market rules or institutions succeed and why others fail. The field has become popular in the recent years with many applications in the sale of spectrum licenses, electricity markets, or the assignment of students to courses.
After participating in the course, the participants understand methods and game-theoretical models of auctions as well as the fundamental problems in the design of combinatorial auctions. They are able to assess the properties of different auction formats, and the results of theoretical and experimental analyses.
Prerequisites:
Students should be familiar with linear and integer optimization. The lecture on algorithmic game theory provides complementary concepts in game theory and related issues in complexity theory.
Syllabus:
- Letures: Fridays, 13:30 - 16:30
- Exercises: Fridays, 10:45 - 12:30
- Final exam: 12.01.2018, 18:00-19:30
Topic Lecture Exercise An introduction to game theory 20.10. 27.10. Game theory and mechanism design 27.10. 03.11. Single-item auctions 03.11. 10.11. Combinatorial auctions 10.11. 17.11. Assignment markets 17.11. 24.11. Iterative combinatorial auctions 24.11. 01.12. Combinatorial clock auctions 01.12. 08.12. Approximation mechanisms 08.12. 15.12. Matching Markets 15.12. 22.12.
Organization:
- Location: classes take place at the MW building, Garching, Room 2250 (5502.02.250).
- Slides: will be made available before each class in the eLearning plattform MOODLE.
- Grading is based on a final exam. Students can earn a grade bonus (0.3) by solving exercises and presenting summaries of the lecture.
- Registration Lecture: register in TUMonline: 04.09.2017 - 05.11.2017.
- Registration Exercise: register inTUMonline: 19.10.2017 - 05.11.2017. (only if you have a Fixplatz in the Lecture)
Literature:
- Lecture notes via MOODLE.
- M. Bichler: Market Design - A Linear Programming Approach to Auctions and Matching. Cambridge University Press. Available online via the TUM library.
- Y. Shoham and K. Leyton-Brown: Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. Available as PDF at: http://www.masfoundations.org/mas.pdf (Chapters 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12)
- N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos and V. Vazirani (editors): Algorithmic Game Theory. Available as PDF at: http://www.cambridge.org/journals/nisan/downloads/Nisan_Non-printable.pdf (Chapters 9 and 11 by Nisan)
- V. Krishna: Auction Theory (Chapters 16 and 17 on multi-object auctions)
Contact:
- Stefan Waldherr
Room 01.10.054
Phone: 289 - 17532
E-Mail: stefan.waldherr at in.tum.de
- Sören Merting
Room 01.10.056
Phone: 289 - 17530
E-Mail: soeren.merting at in.tum.de