Christian Stricker, M.Sc. |
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Department of Informatics (I18)
Technical University of Munich
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| E-Mail: | stricker in.tum.de |
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| Office: |
Room 01.10.039
Boltzmannstr. 3
85748 Garching bei München, Germany
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| Phone: | +49 (0) 89 289 - 17514 | |
| Hours: | by arrangement | |
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Selected Talks
Maximal Lottery Schemes (July 2018)
Voting With Ties (July 2018)
Selected Posters
Maximal Lottery Schemes (July 2018)
Voting With Ties (July 2018)
Short Bio
I am a research assistant in the group of Felix Brandt since June 2017. Before that, I studied Mathematics at the Technical University of Munich. I received my bachelor's degree in 2014 and my master's degree in 2017.
Publications
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong.
Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule.
2021.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, D. Peters, and C. Stricker.
Distribution rules under dichotomous preferences: Two out of
three ain't bad.
In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation (ACM-EC), 2021.
Forthcoming.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Stricker.
An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery
schemes.
Social Choice and Welfare, 2021.
Forthcoming.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker.
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may
contain ties.
2020.
Working paper.
[ pdf ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong.
Donor coordination: Collective distribution of individual
contributions.
In Proceedings of the AAMAS Workshop on Games, Agents, and
Incentives, 2019.
[ pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker.
Voting with ties: Strong impossibilities via SAT solving.
In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1285–1293, 2018.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Stricker.
An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery
schemes.
In Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 114–120, 2018.
[ link |
pdf |
venue ]
C. Stricker.
How frequently do social decision schemes violate desirable
properties?
Master's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2017.
Teaching
Courses
- Algorithmic Game Theory (SS 2016)
- Computational Social Choice (WS 2016/17, WS 2018/19)
- Discrete Structures (WS 2019/20, WS 2020/21)
- Economics and Computation (SS 2017, SS 2018, SS 2019, SS 2020)
- Seminar on Computational Social Choice (SS 2016)
- Seminar on Markets, Algorithms, Incentives, and Networks (WS 2017/18, WS 2019/20)
Student Projects
- Bachelor's thesis Determining the Value of Six (Tobias Schindler, in progress)
- Master's thesis Randomized Tournament Solutions (Adrian Rauchhaus, 2020)
- Master's thesis Non-Bossy Assignment Rules (Jan Wagener, 2020)
- Master's thesis Candidate Proxy Voting via Preference Completion (Ellen Brüls, 2019)
- Master's thesis Strict Participation Incentives in Probabilistic Social Choice (Sophia Koch, 2019)
- Master's thesis Study of the Value of an Asymmetric Zero-Sum Parlor Game (Pia Liebl, 2019)
- Master's thesis Computer-Aided Impossibilities for Randomized Matching Markets (Fabio Bove, 2019)
- Master's thesis Randomized Social Decision Making: Theory, Experiments, and Philosophy (Christina Dosch, 2018)
Community Service
Refereeing Journals
Refereeing Conferences