Economics and Computation

Content

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in topics at the intersection of economics and computer science, as witnessed by the continued rapid rise of research areas such as algorithmic game theory and computational social choice. This development is due to the emergence of computational networks such as the Internet as well as the need to get a grip on algorithmic questions in economics.
The emphasis in this seminar lies on the independent study of classic economics papers, but also, and in particular, more recent papers from computer science. Among the topics to be covered are matching theory, mechanism design, and voting theory.

Registration

+++ Registration is closed and all seats have been assigned +++

Seats are limited and therefore students will have to apply for the seminar. Students should sent their application by email briefly describing their background (including relevant courses) and motivation (up to 250 words) as well as 2-5 papers they would be interested in. Deadline for applications: Wednesday, February 5 (11:59pm)
Notifications will be sent out on Friday, February 7 (including assignment of papers and supervisors). Registration in TUMonline will be taken care of by the lecturers by February 26; no further action is required.

Time and venue

Overview (Vorbesprechung):

Wednesday, January 29, 14.00 - 15.00, room 01.10.011 (slides)

First meeting:

Tuesday, April 15, 14.00 - 16.00, room 01.10.011 (slides)

Talks:

Tuesday, May 13, 14.00 - 17.00, room 01.10.011
- Talk 1
  Speaker: Manuel
  Session chair: Martin
  A. Abdulkadiroglu and T. Sönmez. School choice: A mechanism design approach. American Economic Review, 93(3):729—747, 2003.
  M. Balinski and T. Sönmez. A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement. Journal of Economic Theory, 84(1):73–94, 1999.
Talk 2
Speaker: Christopher
Session chair: Stefan
A. Abdulkadiroglu and T. Sönmez. House allocation with existing tenants. Journal of Economic Theory, 88(2):233–260, 1999.
R. W. Irving. An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem. Journal of Algorithms, 6(4):577–595, 1985.

Tuesday, May 20, 14.00 - 17.00, room 01.12.035
- Talk 3
  Speaker: Orest
  Session chair: Claudia
  T. Roughgarden and É. Tardos. How bad is selfish routing? Journal of the ACM, 49(2):236–259, 2002.
- Talk 4
  Speaker: Valentin
  Session chair: Vedat
  U. Endriss, N. Maudet, F. Sadri, and F. Toni. Negotiating socially optimal allocations of resources. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 25:315–348, 2006.
  M. O. Jackson and A. Wolinsky. A strategic model of social and economic networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 71(1):44–74, 1996.

Friday, May 23, 14.00 - 17.00, room 01.12.035
- Talk 5
  Speaker: Matthias
  Session chair: Manuel
  J. Bartholdi, III, C. A. Tovey, and M. A. Trick. The computational difficulty of manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(3):227–241, 1989.
  V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, and J. Lang. When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? Journal of the ACM, 54(3), 2007.
- Talk 6
  Speaker: Stefan
  Session chair: Sebastian
  M. Pauly. Can strategizing in round-robin subtournaments be avoided? Social Choice and Welfare, pages 1–18, 2013.
  S. Sato. Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders. Social Choice and Welfare, 40(2):479–494, 2013.

Tuesday, May 27, 14.00 - 17.00, room 01.10.011
- Talk 7
  Speaker: Vedat
  Session chair: Orest
  X. Deng and C. H. Papadimitriou. On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts. Mathematics of Operations Research, 12(2):257–266, 1994.
- Talk 8
  Speaker: Martin
  Session chair: Christopher
  A. Bogomolnaia and M. O. Jackson. The stability of hedonic coalition structures. Games and Economic Behavior, 38(2):201–230, 2002.
  J. Hajduková. Coalition formation games: A survey. International Game Theory Review, 8(4):613–641, 2006.

Tuesday, June 3, 14.00 - 17.00, room 01.10.011
- Talk 9
  Speaker: Claudia
  Session chair: Matthias
  S. Barberà. Majority and positional voting in a probabilistic framework. Review of Economic Studies, 46(2):379–389, 1979.
  A. Gibbard. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance. Econometrica, 45(3):665–681, 1977.
- Talk 10
  Speaker: Sebastian
  Session chair: Valentin
  S. J. Brams and A. D. Taylor. An envy-free cake division protocol. The American Mathematical Monthly, 102(1):9–18, 1995.
  W. Stromquist. How to cut a cake fairly. American Mathematical Monthly, 87(8):640–644, 1980.

Preliminary selection of articles

A. Abdulkadiroglu and T. Sönmez. House allocation with existing tenants. Journal of Economic Theory, 88(2):233–260, 1999.

A. Abdulkadiroglu and T. Sönmez. School choice: A mechanism design approach. American Economic Review, 93(3):729—747, 2003.

M. Balinski and T. Sönmez. A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement. Journal of Economic Theory, 84(1):73–94, 1999.

S. Barberà. Majority and positional voting in a probabilistic framework. Review of Economic Studies, 46(2):379–389, 1979.

J. Bartholdi, III, C. A. Tovey, and M. A. Trick. The computational difficulty of manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(3):227–241, 1989.

A. Bogomolnaia and M. O. Jackson. The stability of hedonic coalition structures. Games and Economic Behavior, 38(2):201–230, 2002.

A. Bogomolnaia and H. Moulin. A new solution to the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 100(2):295–328, 2001.

S. J. Brams and A. D. Taylor. An envy-free cake division protocol. The American Mathematical Monthly, 102(1):9–18, 1995.

V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, and J. Lang. When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? Journal of the ACM, 54(3), 2007.

X. Deng and C. H. Papadimitriou. On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts. Mathematics of Operations Research, 12(2):257–266, 1994.

J. Duggan and T. Schwartz. Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard- Satterthwaite generalized. Social Choice and Welfare, 17(1):85–93, 2000.

U. Endriss, N. Maudet, F. Sadri, and F. Toni. Negotiating socially optimal allocations of resources. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 25:315–348, 2006.

P. C. Fishburn. Probabilistic social choice based on simple voting comparisons. Review of Economic Studies, 51(167):683–692, 1984.

P. C. Fishburn. SSB utility theory: An economic perspective. Mathematical Social Sciences, 8(1):63–94, 1984.

D. C. Fisher and J. Ryan. Optimal strategies for a generalized “scissors, paper, and stone” game. American Mathematical Monthly, 99(10):935–942, 1992.

A. Gibbard. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance. Econometrica, 45(3):665–681, 1977.

J. Hajduková. Coalition formation games: A survey. International Game Theory Review, 8(4):613–641, 2006.

M. D. Intriligator. A probabilistic model of social choice. Review of Economic Studies, 40(4):553–560, 1973.

R. W. Irving. An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem. Journal of Algorithms, 6(4):577–595, 1985.

M. O. Jackson and A. Wolinsky. A strategic model of social and economic networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 71(1):44–74, 1996.

D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14(1):124–143, 1996.

N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior, 35(1):166–196, 2001.

M. Pauly. Can strategizing in round-robin subtournaments be avoided? Social Choice and Welfare, pages 1–18, 2013.

T. Roughgarden and É. Tardos. How bad is selfish routing? Journal of the ACM, 49(2):236–259, 2002.

T. Sandholm. Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artificial Intelligence, 135(1–2):1–54, 2002.

S. Sato. Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders. Social Choice and Welfare, 40(2):479–494, 2013.

P. Tang and F. Lin. Computer-aided proofs of Arrow’s and other impossibility theorems. Artificial Intelligence, 173(11):1041–1053, 2009.

H. P. Young. Optimal voting rules. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(1):51–64, 1995.

Other resources

Feedback guidelines (1) (2) [in addition to what is presented during the first meeting]

Practicalities

The seminar will be held in English (i.e., all presentations will have to be in English, too)

Module-Codes

IN2107 (Master-Seminar in the Master program Informatik)
IN0014 (Seminar in the Bachelor programs Informatik, Wirtschaftsinformatik)
For all other programs: Please check first whether this seminar fits in your curriculum. For example, mathematics students should find it listed as a mathematics seminar, too.

Contact

Florian Brandl
Christian Geist