Wednesday, 16 May 2012

Prof. Felix Brandt

Supervision Dr. Haris Aziz, Dipl.-Math. Markus BrillDipl.-Math. Hans Georg Seedig, and Prof. Dr. Felix Brandt

Seminar SS 2011

Economics and Computation

Updated: June 14

Content

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in topics at the intersection of economics and computer science, as witnessed by the rapid rise of research areas such as algorithmic game theory and computational social choice. This development is due to the emergence of computational networks such as the Internet as well as the need to get a grip on algorithmic questions in economics.
The emphasis in this seminar lies on the independent study of classic economics papers as well as more recent papers from computer science. Among the topics to be covered are matching theory, combinatorial auctions, tournaments, and the manipulation of voting rules. 

Time and venue

First meeting:

  • May 11, 14.15-16.15 (room 01.12.035)

Regular meetings:

  • June 8, 14.00-16.30 (room 01.12.035)
  • June 15, 14.00-16.30 (room 01.10.011)
  • June 22, 14.00-16.30 (room 01.10.011)
  • June 29, 14.00-16.30 (room 01.10.011)
  • July 6,  14.00-16.30 (room 01.10.011)

Schedule

# Date Time Speaker Session Chair Supervisor Paper

June 8 14.00  Johannes  Markus  Paul  Aumann, 1974
1
June 8 14.00  Julian  Johannes  Haris  Roughgarden, 2010
2
June 15 14.00  Elisabeth  Alysa  Hans Georg
 Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002

June 15 15.30  Alexander  Elisabeth  Markus  Sandholm, 2002
3
June 22 14.00  Tina  Bernhard  Haris
 Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1999
4
June 22 15.30
 Jutta  Florian  Haris  Irving, 1985
5
June 29 14.00  Bernhard  Jutta  Haris  Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996
6
June 29 15.30  Alysa  Julian  Markus  Nisan and Ronen, 2001
7
July 6 14.00
 Katharina  Tina  Markus  Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick, 1989
8
July 6 15.30  Florian  Katharina  Markus  Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang, 2007

Papers

  1. T. Roughgarden. Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective. Economic Theory, 42(1): 193–236, 2010.
  2. T. Roughgarden and É. Tardos. How bad is selfish routing? Journal of the ACM, 49(2):236–259, 2002.
  3. A. Abdulkadiroğlu and T. Sönmez. House allocation with existing tenants. Journal of Economic Theory, 88(2):233–260, 1999.
  4. R. W. Irving. An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem. Journal of Algorithms, 6(4): 577–595, 1985.
  5. M. O. Jackson and A. Wolinsky. A strategic model of social and economic networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 71(1):44–74, 1996.
  6. N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior, 35(1):166–196, 2001.
  7. J. Bartholdi, III, C. A. Tovey, and M. A. Trick. The computational difficulty of manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(3):227–241, 1989.
  8. V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, and J. Lang. When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? Journal of the ACM, 54(3), 2007.

Information material

Registration

Via TUMonline. Registration is closed.

Modul-Codes

  • IN2107 (Master-Seminar in the Master program Informatik)
  • IN0014 (Seminar in the Bachelor programs Informatik, Wirtschaftsinformatik)
  • IN8901 (Seminar in diploma programs)
  • For all other programs: Please check first whether this seminar fits in your curriculum. For example, mathematics students don't have problems to get credit for it.

Contact

Markus Brill 
Email: brillaltin.tum.de

Decision Sciences & Systems (DSS), Department of Informatics (I18), Technische Universität München, Boltzmannstr. 3, 85748 Garching, Germany
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