Saturday, 29 August 2015

Algorithmic Game Theory and Computational Social Choice

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Overview

Game theory is the mathematical study of strategic behavior in interactive decision making environments, in which the utility of each agent not only depends on his own decisions but also on those of other agents. A central concern of game theory is the development and analysis of solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium or the core, which provide answers to such diverse questions as to which actions rational agents and groups of agents can be expected to choose, which coalitions are likely to form, and how the earnings of the collaboration are to be divided. Our group is devoted to studying the formal properties of solution concepts--computational and non-computational--in various classes of games.
Social choice theory concerns the formal analysis and design of methods for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents and has many theoretical and real-life applications such as voting, resource allocation, coalition formation, and ranking objects. Our main focus lies on the axiomatic and algorithmic investigation of set-valued and probabilistic aggregation procedures.

Team Members

Former Members

Projects

Teaching

  • Algorithmic Game Theory (Lecture & tutorials)
  • Computational Social Choice (Lecture & tutorials)
  • Economics and Computation (Seminar)
  • Multiagent Systems (Seminar)

PhD theses

H. G. Seedig. Majority relations and tournament solutions: A computational study. PhD thesis, Technische Universität München, 2015. [ pdf ]

M. Brill. Set-valued solution concepts in social choice and game theory. PhD thesis, Technische Universität München, 2012. [ pdf ]

F. Fischer. Complexity results for some classes complexity results for some classes of strategic games. PhD thesis, Ludwigs-Maximilians-Universität München, 2009. [ pdf ]

Bachelor and Master theses

G. Bachmeier. Majority relations for a constant number of voters. Interdisciplinary project report, Technische Universität München, 2014.

J. K. von Wedel. Agents' optimal strategies for deferred acceptance algorithms. Master's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2014.

S. Turchetta. Payoff query complexity of approximate nash equilibria in anonymous games. Master's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2014.

K. Kardel. Participation and group-participation in social choice theory. Master's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2014.

G. Chabin. Pnyx: A user-friendly and powerful aggregation tool. Master's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2014.

M. Strobel. Fractional hedonic games - Individual and group stability notions. Master's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2014.

J. Hofbauer. Participation conditions for irresolute social choice functions and social decision schemes. Master's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2014.

M. Bay. Answer set programming for computer-aided theorem proving in social choice theory. Bachelor's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2014.

K. Kardel. On the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters. Interdisciplinary project report, Technische Universität München, 2013.

K. Röhner. Payment optimization. Interdisciplinary project report, Technische Universität München, 2013.

M. Reiter. A scoring method for tournaments based on minimal gain scores. Bachelor's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2013.

A. Schmalstieg. Markov chains and social decision schemes. Bachelor's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2013.

E. Brändle. Constraint satisfaction programming for computer-aided theorem proving in social choice theory. Master's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2013.

F. Brandl. Efficiency and incentives in randomized social choice. Master's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2013. [ pdf ]

C. Kaul. Voting power in the German Bundestag. Master's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2012.

L. Louca. A graphical tool for computing Shapley's saddles in zero-sum games. Master's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2012.

A. H. L. Dau. Transitive subtournaments and set-theoretic relationships between tournament solutions. Interdisciplinary project report, Technische Universität München, 2011.

J. Frieden. Variants of the stable roommates problem. Bachelor's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2011.

F. Brandl. Existence of stability in hedonic coalition formation games. Bachelor's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2011.

Journal Papers

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Welfare maximization entices participation. 2015. Working paper. [ pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. Universal dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 60:123-133, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 53:439-496, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Consistent probabilistic social choice. 2015. Working paper. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, and W. Suksompong. An ordinal minimax theorem. 2015. Working paper. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig. Minimal extending sets in tournaments. 2015. Working paper. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, A. Dau, and H. G. Seedig. Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 187:41-49, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, C. Geist, and P. Harrenstein. A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality. Social Choice and Welfare, 2015. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt. Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness. Social Choice and Welfare, 2015. Forthcoming. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, M. Brill, and J. Mestre. Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 13(2):26-30, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. Social Choice and Welfare, 42(3):551-574, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Testing substitutability of weak preferences. Mathematical Social Sciences, 66(1):91-94, 2013.

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. Artificial Intelligence, 195:316-334, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Pareto optimality in coalition formation. Games and Economic Behavior, 82:562-581, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the rate of convergence of fictitious play. Theory of Computing Systems, 53(1):41-52, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe. The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets. Theory of Computing Systems, 53(3):467-502, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship. Economics Letters, 121(3):341-345, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Chudnovsky, I. Kim, G. Liu, S. Norin, A. Scott, P. Seymour, and S. Thomassé. A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz. Social Choice and Welfare, 40:739-743, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and M. Brill. Computing dominance-based solution concepts. 2012. Working paper. [ pdf ]

H. Aziz, Y. Bachrach, E. Elkind, and M. Paterson. False-name manipulations in weighted voting games. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), 40(57-93), 2011.

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):162-181, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann. The computational complexity of weak saddles. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):139-161, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries. Theoretical Computer Science, 412:675-685, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt. Minimal stable sets in tournaments. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1481-1499, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and M. Brill. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of irresolute social choice functions. 2011. Working paper. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1721-1731, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair. A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. Social Choice and Welfare, 34(4):597-609, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games. Theory and Decision, 69(2):233-256, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 75(3):163-177, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. The computational complexity of choice sets. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):444-459, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt. Some remarks on Dodgson's voting rule. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):460-463, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and J. Hoffmann. Computing Shapley's saddles. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 8(2), 2009. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham. Ranking games. Artificial Intelligence, 173(2):221-239, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. On the existence of unconditionally privacy-preserving auction protocols. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 11(2), 2008. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and F. Fischer. Computing the minimal covering set. Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(2):254-268, 2008. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt. How to obtain full privacy in auctions. International Journal of Information Security, 5(4):201-216, 2006. [ link | pdf ]

Conference and Other Papers

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer. Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive results and computer-generated impossibilities. In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 18-24. AAAI Press, 2015. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, G. Chabin, and C. Geist. Pnyx: A powerful and user-friendly tool for preference aggregation. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1915-1916. IFAAMAS, 2015. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Incentives for participation and abstention in probabilistic social choice. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1411-1419. IFAAMAS, 2015. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt and H. G. Seedig. On the discriminative power of tournament solutions. In Selected papers of the International Conference on Operations Research, OR2014, Operations Research Proceedings. Springer-Verlag, 2015. Forthcoming. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Strobel. Fractional hedonic games: Individual and group stability. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1219-1227. IFAAMAS, 2015. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia. Introduction to computational social choice. In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia, editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chapter 1. Cambridge University Press, 2015. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Tournament solutions. In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia, editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chapter 3. Cambridge University Press, 2015. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig. Minimal extending sets in tournaments. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1539-1540. IFAAMAS, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Fractional hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 5-12. IFAAMAS, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. On the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in randomized social choice. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 545-551. AAAI Press, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, C. Geist, and H. G. Seedig. Identifying k-majority digraphs via SAT solving. In Proceedings of the 1st AAMAS Workshop on Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in Computational Social Choice (EXPLORE), 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Extending tournament solutions. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 580-586. AAAI Press, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. Universal dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), pages 331-332. ACM Press, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

C. Geist. Finding preference profiles of Condorcet dimension k via SAT. Technical report, http://arxiv.org/abs/1402.4303, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and C. Geist. Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1193-1200. IFAAMAS, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz and C. Yu. Individual-based stability in hedonic games depending on the best or worst players. Technical Report 1307.2908, http://arxiv.org, 2013.

H. Aziz. Maximal recursive rule: A new social decision scheme. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 34-40, 2013.

H. Aziz. Stable marriage and roommate problems with individual-based stability. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 287-294, 2013.

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship. In Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), volume 8289 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 24-25. Springer-Verlag, 2013. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, and U. Endriss. Computational social choice. In G. Weiß, editor, Multiagent Systems, chapter 6, pages 213-283. MIT Press, 2nd edition, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Stursberg. On popular random assignments. In Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 8146 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 183-194. Springer-Verlag, 2013. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, K. Kardel, and H. G. Seedig. It only takes a few: On the hardness of voting with a constant number of agents. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 375-382. IFAAMAS, 2013. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt and H. G. Seedig. A tournament of order 24 with two disjoint TEQ-retentive sets. Technical report, http://arxiv.org/abs/1302.5592, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and strategyproofness in randomized social choice. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 455-462. IFAAMAS, 2013. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz and B. de Keijzer. Housing markets with indifferences: a tale of two mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 1249-1255, 2012.

H. Aziz, P. Harrenstein, and E. Pyrga. Individual-based stability in hedonic games depending on the best or worst players. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1311-1312, 2012.

H. Aziz, M. Brill, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, J. Lang, and H. G. Seedig. Possible and necessary winners of partial tournaments. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 585-592. IFAAMAS, 2012. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz and F. Brandl. Existence of stability in hedonic coalition formation games. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 763-770. IFAAMAS, 2012. [ pdf ]

M. Brill and F. Fischer. The price of neutrality for the ranked pairs method. In Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 1299-1305. AAAI Press, 2012. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt and M. Brill. Computing dominance-based solution concepts. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), page 233. ACM Press, 2012. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz and T. B. Sørensen. Path coalitional games. In Proceedings of The Second Workshop on Cooperative Games in Multiagent Systems (CoopMAS), 2011. [ pdf ]

H. Aziz and B. de Keijzer. Complexity of coalition structure generation. In P. Yolum and K. Tumer, editors, Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 191-198, 2011. [ venue ]

G. Christodoulou, K. Mehlhorn, and E. Pyrga. Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms, ESA'11, pages 119-130. Springer-Verlag, 2011. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt. From Arrow's impossibility to Schwartz's tournament equilibrium set (Invited tutorial). In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Relational and Algebraic Methods in Computer Science, volume 6663 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 50-51. Springer-Verlag, 2011.

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 43-48. AAAI Press, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 183-190. IFAAMAS, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Pareto optimality in coalition formation. In Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 93-104. Springer-Verlag, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt. Group-strategyproof irresolute social choice functions. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 79-84. AAAI Press, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, and H. G. Seedig. On the fixed-parameter tractability of composition-consistent tournament solutions. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 85-90. AAAI Press, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt and M. Brill. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of irresolute social choice functions. In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 136-142. ACM Press, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

G. Christodoulou, K. Ligett, and E. Pyrga. Contention resolution under selfishness. In S. Abramsky, C. Gavoille, C. Kirchner, F. M. auf der Heide, and P. Spirakis, editors, Proceedings of the 37th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP), volume 6199 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 430-441. Springer-Verlag, 2010. [ pdf ]

H. G. Seedig. Network flow optimization with minimum quantities. In B. Hu, K. Morasch, S. Pickl, and M. Siegle, editors, Operations Research Proceedings 2010, pages 295-300. Springer, 2010. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 47-54. IFAAMAS, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Monotone cooperative games and their threshold versions. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1017-1024. IFAAMAS, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the rate of convergence of fictitious play. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), number 6386 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 102-113. Springer-Verlag, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. On iterated dominance, matrix elimination, and matched paths. In Proceedings of the 27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 107-118. LZI, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt. Auctions. In B. Rosenberg, editor, Handbook of Financial Cryptography and Security, chapter 2, pages 49-58. CRC Press, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe. The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), number 6078 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 299-310. Springer-Verlag, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. In Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 715-722. AAAI Press, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

H. Aziz, O. Lachish, M. Paterson, and R. Savani. Power indices in spanning connectivity games. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management (AAIM), volume 5564 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 55-67. Springer-Verlag, 2009.

F. Brandt. Tournament solutions - Extensions of maximality and their applications to decision-making. Habilitation Thesis, Faculty for Mathematics, Computer Science, and Statistics, University of Munich, 2009. [ pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 287-298. Springer-Verlag, 2009. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Computational aspects of Shapley's saddles. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 209-216. IFAAMAS, 2009. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann. The computational complexity of weak saddles. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 238-249. Springer-Verlag, 2009. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries. In Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), volume 5385 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 198-209. Springer-Verlag, 2008. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair. A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. In Proceedings of the 23rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 38-43. AAAI Press, 2008. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt and F. Fischer. On the hardness and existence of quasi-strict equilibria. In Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 4997 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 291-302. Springer-Verlag, 2008. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt. Minimal stable sets in tournaments. Technical report, http://arxiv.org/abs/0803.2138, 2008. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and F. Fischer. PageRank as a weak tournament solution. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), volume 4858 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 300-305. Springer-Verlag, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, T. Sandholm, and Y. Shoham. Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions. In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1207-1214. Morgan Kaufmann, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham. A game-theoretic analysis of strictly competitive multiagent scenarios. In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1199-1206. Morgan Kaufmann, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. The computational complexity of choice sets. In Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 82-91. ACM Press, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt and F. Fischer. Computational aspects of covering in dominance graphs. In Proceedings of the 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 694-699. AAAI Press, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

P. Harrenstein, F. Brandt, and F. Fischer. Commitment and extortion. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 108-115. IFAAMAS, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. In Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 4393 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 212-223. Springer-Verlag, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and Y. Shoham. On strictly competitive multi-player games. In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 605-612. AAAI Press, 2006. [ link | pdf | venue ]

Decision Sciences & Systems (DSS), Department of Informatics (I18), Technische Universität München, Boltzmannstr. 3, 85748 Garching, Germany
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