Monday, 06 July 2015
brandt_small  

Prof. Dr. Felix Brandt

Institut für Informatik
(secondary appointment: Zentrum für Mathematik)
Technische Universität München
E-Mail: brandtATtum.de
Phone:  +49 (0) 89 289 - 17512
Office: Room 01.10.037
Boltzmannstr 3
85748 Munich, Germany
Hours: by arrangement
Assistant: Maria Anna Thanner
Recent Highlights
Selected Posters
Fun

My research interests cover most of the fundamental issues that arise when multiple self-interested entities, so-called agents, interact. These issues include the analysis of optimal rational behavior in interactive situations and the design of mechanisms that allow agents to aggregate their possibly conflicting preferences such as in voting or auctions. In addition to tools from mathematics and economics, many concepts from theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence have turned out to be very useful when analyzing such situations. In general, my interest is confined to statements that can be proved or disproved using formal methods.

Raison d'être

  • Brief Bio: I am a Professor for Algorithmic Game Theory in the Computer Science Department of TUM. Prior to this appointment, I was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Carnegie Mellon University and Stanford University and an Emmy Noether Junior Research Group Leader at Ludwig Maximilians University. I received my Diploma and my PhD degree from TUM.
  • Curriculum vitae: [ English ] [ German ]

    Working Papers

    F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Consistent probabilistic social choice. 2015. Working paper. [ pdf ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, and W. Suksompong. An ordinal minimax theorem. 2015. Working paper. [ pdf ]

    F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig. Minimal extending sets in tournaments. 2015. Working paper. [ pdf ]

    F. Brandt, C. Geist, and P. Harrenstein. A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality. 2014. Working paper. [ pdf ]

    F. Brandt and M. Brill. Computing dominance-based solution concepts. 2012. Working paper. [ pdf ]

    F. Brandt and M. Brill. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of irresolute social choice functions. 2011. Working paper. [ pdf ]

    Book Chapters

    F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia. Introduction to computational social choice. In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia, editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chapter 1. Cambridge University Press, 2015. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Tournament solutions. In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia, editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chapter 3. Cambridge University Press, 2015. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

    F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, and U. Endriss. Computational social choice. In G. Weiß, editor, Multiagent Systems, chapter 6, pages 213-283. MIT Press, 2nd edition, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt. Auctions. In B. Rosenberg, editor, Handbook of Financial Cryptography and Security, chapter 2, pages 49-58. CRC Press, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

    Journal Papers

    H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. Universal dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2015. Forthcoming.

    F. Brandt, A. Dau, and H. G. Seedig. Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 187:41-49, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt. Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness. Social Choice and Welfare, 2015. Forthcoming. [ link | pdf ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandt, M. Brill, and J. Mestre. Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 13(2):26-30, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. Social Choice and Welfare, 42(3):551-574, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. Artificial Intelligence, 195:316-334, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Pareto optimality in coalition formation. Games and Economic Behavior, 82:562-581, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the rate of convergence of fictitious play. Theory of Computing Systems, 53(1):41-52, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

    D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe. The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets. Theory of Computing Systems, 53(3):467-502, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship. Economics Letters, 121(3):341-345, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, M. Chudnovsky, I. Kim, G. Liu, S. Norin, A. Scott, P. Seymour, and S. Thomassé. A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz. Social Choice and Welfare, 40:739-743, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):162-181, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann. The computational complexity of weak saddles. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):139-161, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries. Theoretical Computer Science, 412:675-685, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt. Minimal stable sets in tournaments. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1481-1499, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1721-1731, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair. A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. Social Choice and Welfare, 34(4):597-609, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games. Theory and Decision, 69(2):233-256, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 75(3):163-177, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. The computational complexity of choice sets. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):444-459, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt. Some remarks on Dodgson's voting rule. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):460-463, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and J. Hoffmann. Computing Shapley's saddles. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 8(2), 2009. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham. Ranking games. Artificial Intelligence, 173(2):221-239, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. On the existence of unconditionally privacy-preserving auction protocols. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 11(2), 2008. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt and F. Fischer. Computing the minimal covering set. Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(2):254-268, 2008. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt. How to obtain full privacy in auctions. International Journal of Information Security, 5(4):201-216, 2006. [ link | pdf ]

    Conference and Other Papers

    F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer. Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive results and computer-generated impossibilities. In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2015. Forthcoming. [ pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, G. Chabin, and C. Geist. Pnyx: A powerful and user-friendly tool for preference aggregation. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1915-1916. IFAAMAS, 2015. [ pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Incentives for participation and abstention in probabilistic social choice. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1411-1419. IFAAMAS, 2015. [ pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and H. G. Seedig. On the discriminative power of tournament solutions. In Selected papers of the International Conference on Operations Research, OR2014, Operations Research Proceedings. Springer-Verlag, 2015. Forthcoming. [ pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Strobel. Fractional hedonic games: Individual and group stability. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1219-1227. IFAAMAS, 2015. [ pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig. Minimal extending sets in tournaments. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1539-1540. IFAAMAS, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Fractional hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 5-12. IFAAMAS, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. On the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in randomized social choice. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 545-551. AAAI Press, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, C. Geist, and H. G. Seedig. Identifying k-majority digraphs via SAT solving. In Proceedings of the 1st AAMAS Workshop on Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in Computational Social Choice (EXPLORE), 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Extending tournament solutions. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 580-586. AAAI Press, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. Universal dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), pages 331-332. ACM Press, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and C. Geist. Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1193-1200. IFAAMAS, 2014. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship. In Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), volume 8289 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 24-25. Springer-Verlag, 2013. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Stursberg. On popular random assignments. In Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 8146 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 183-194. Springer-Verlag, 2013. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, K. Kardel, and H. G. Seedig. It only takes a few: On the hardness of voting with a constant number of agents. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 375-382. IFAAMAS, 2013. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and H. G. Seedig. A tournament of order 24 with two disjoint TEQ-retentive sets. Technical report, http://arxiv.org/abs/1302.5592, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and strategyproofness in randomized social choice. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 455-462. IFAAMAS, 2013. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and M. Brill. Computing dominance-based solution concepts. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), page 233. ACM Press, 2012. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt. From Arrow's impossibility to Schwartz's tournament equilibrium set (Invited tutorial). In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Relational and Algebraic Methods in Computer Science, volume 6663 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 50-51. Springer-Verlag, 2011.

    H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 43-48. AAAI Press, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 183-190. IFAAMAS, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Pareto optimality in coalition formation. In Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 93-104. Springer-Verlag, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt. Group-strategyproof irresolute social choice functions. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 79-84. AAAI Press, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, and H. G. Seedig. On the fixed-parameter tractability of composition-consistent tournament solutions. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 85-90. AAAI Press, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and M. Brill. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of irresolute social choice functions. In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 136-142. ACM Press, 2011. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 47-54. IFAAMAS, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Monotone cooperative games and their threshold versions. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1017-1024. IFAAMAS, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the rate of convergence of fictitious play. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), number 6386 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 102-113. Springer-Verlag, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. On iterated dominance, matrix elimination, and matched paths. In Proceedings of the 27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 107-118. LZI, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe. The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), number 6078 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 299-310. Springer-Verlag, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. In Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 715-722. AAAI Press, 2010. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt. Tournament solutions - Extensions of maximality and their applications to decision-making. Habilitation Thesis, Faculty for Mathematics, Computer Science, and Statistics, University of Munich, 2009. [ pdf ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 287-298. Springer-Verlag, 2009. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Computational aspects of Shapley's saddles. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 209-216. IFAAMAS, 2009. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann. The computational complexity of weak saddles. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 238-249. Springer-Verlag, 2009. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries. In Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), volume 5385 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 198-209. Springer-Verlag, 2008. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair. A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. In Proceedings of the 23rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 38-43. AAAI Press, 2008. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and F. Fischer. On the hardness and existence of quasi-strict equilibria. In Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), volume 4997 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 291-302. Springer-Verlag, 2008. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt. Minimal stable sets in tournaments. Technical report, http://arxiv.org/abs/0803.2138, 2008. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt and F. Fischer. PageRank as a weak tournament solution. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), volume 4858 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 300-305. Springer-Verlag, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, T. Sandholm, and Y. Shoham. Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions. In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1207-1214. Morgan Kaufmann, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham. A game-theoretic analysis of strictly competitive multiagent scenarios. In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1199-1206. Morgan Kaufmann, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. The computational complexity of choice sets. In Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 82-91. ACM Press, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and F. Fischer. Computational aspects of covering in dominance graphs. In Proceedings of the 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 694-699. AAAI Press, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    P. Harrenstein, F. Brandt, and F. Fischer. Commitment and extortion. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 108-115. IFAAMAS, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. In Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 4393 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 212-223. Springer-Verlag, 2007. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and Y. Shoham. On strictly competitive multi-player games. In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 605-612. AAAI Press, 2006. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 357-364. ACM Press, 2005. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. On correctness and privacy in distributed mechanisms. In Revised selected papers from the 7th AAMAS Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), volume 3937 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI), pages 212-225, 2005. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. Unconditional privacy in social choice. In Proceedings of the 10th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 207-218. ACM Press, 2005. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. Efficient privacy-preserving protocols for multi-unit auctions. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC), volume 3570 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 298-312. Springer-Verlag, 2005. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt. Efficient cryptographic protocol design based on distributed El Gamal encryption. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology (ICISC), volume 3935 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 32-47. Springer-Verlag, 2005. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. (Im)possibility of unconditionally privacy-preserving auctions. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 810-817. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2004. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC), volume 2742 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 223-238. Springer-Verlag, 2003. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt. Social choice and preference protection - Towards fully private mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 220-221. ACM Press, 2003. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt. Private public choice. Technical Report FKI-247-03, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich, 2003. ISSN 0941-6358. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt. Fundamental aspects of privacy and deception in electronic auctions. Doctoral Thesis, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich, 2003. [ link | errata ]

    F. Brandt. Secure and private auctions without auctioneers. Technical Report FKI-245-02, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich, 2002. ISSN 0941-6358. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt. A verifiable, bidder-resolved auction protocol. In Proceedings of the 5th AAMAS Workshop on Deception, Fraud and Trust in Agent Societies (Special Track on Privacy and Protection with Multi-Agent Systems), 2002. [ pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and G. Weiß. Antisocial agents and Vickrey auctions. In Intelligent Agents VIII, volume 2333 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI), pages 335-347. Springer-Verlag, 2001. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and G. Weiß. Vicious strategies for Vickrey auctions. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Autonomous Agents, pages 71-72. ACM Press, 2001. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt. Cryptographic protocols for secure second-price auctions. In Cooperative Information Agents V, volume 2182 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI), pages 154-165. Springer-Verlag, 2001. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt. Antisocial bidding in repeated Vickrey auctions. Technical Report FKI-241-00, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich, 2000. ISSN 0941-6358. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt and G. Weiß. Exploring auction-based leveled commitment contracting. Part III: Vickrey-type auctioning. Technical Report FKI-238-00, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich, 2000. ISSN 0941-6358. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt, W. Brauer, and G. Weiß. Task assignment in multiagent systems based on Vickrey-type auctioning and leveled commitment contracting. In Cooperative Information Agents IV, volume 1860 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI), pages 95-106. Springer-Verlag, 2000. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and G. Weiß. Exploring auction-based leveled commitment contracting. Part II: Dutch-type auctioning. Technical Report FKI-237-00, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich, 2000. ISSN 0941-6358. [ link | pdf ]

    S. Schulz and F. Brandt. Using term space maps to capture search control knowledge in equational theorem proving. In Proceedings of the 12th Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference (FLAIRS), pages 244-248. AAAI Press, 1999. [ link | pdf | venue ]

    F. Brandt and G. Weiß. Exploring auction-based leveled commitment contracting. Part I: English-type auctioning. Technical Report FKI-234-99, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich, 1999. ISSN 0941-6358. [ link | pdf ]

    F. Brandt. Example selection for learning in automated theorem proving. Diploma Thesis, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich, 1998. [ pdf ]

    Non-Scientific Publications

    F. Brandt. Wie programmiere ich eine optimierte Linienroutine in Assembler?. TOS (Magazin plus Software für den Atari ST & TT), 07/93, 1993. [ jpg ]

    F. Brandt. "Fullscreen"-Programming on the Atari ST. Maggie, Issue #10, 1993. [ txt ]

    F. Brandt. Die Tricks der Fullscreen-Programmierung. TOS (Magazin plus Software für den Atari ST & TT), 02/92, 1992. [ jpg ]

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