Stefan Mayer
 |
Stefan Karl Mayer |
Contact Information
| Stefan Mayer | |
| E-Mail: | This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. |
| Phone: | +49 (0) 89 289 - 17504 |
| Fax: | |
| Office: | Room 01.10.057 Boltzmannstr 3 85748 Munich, Germany |
| Hours: | by arrangement |
Short Bio
Stefan Mayer, born on 17.07.1986, studied industrial engineering at the Technical University of Karlsruhe (KIT) and the elite graduate program "Finance and Information Management" (FIM) at University of Augsburg (UA) and the Technical University of Munich (TUM). During his studies he completed several internships for Eurocopter Deutschland (an EADS company) in Donauwoerth, o2 germany in Munich, Telefonica S.A. in Madrid and was visiting researcher at HP Labs in Palo Alto. Since he has finished his master degree with honors in Finance and Information Management in 2011, he is working as full-time research assistant at the chair of Decision Sciences and Systems (DSS). Besides, Stefan is commissioner in assessment fairs for The Max Weber-Program of Bavaria (German National Academic Foundation).
Fields of Interest
- Linear Optimization
- Auction Theory and Market Desgin
- Combinatorial Auctions
- Split Award Auctions
Selected Academic Activities
- Auction Design in Markets with Economies of Scale and Scope (HP Labs Palo Alto)
- Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. But Preference elicitation becomes prohibitive even for small instances of multi-unit combinatorial auctions, as suppliers cannot be expected to enumerate a sufficient number of bids that would allow an auctioneer to find the efficient allocation. Auction design for markets with economies of scale and scope are much less well understood. They require more compact and yet expressive bidding languages, and supplier selection typically is a hard computational problem.
We proposed an adequate bidding language to express the characteristics of a supplier’s production function in markets with economies of scale and scope. Now our research focuses on efficient feedback calculation and mechanism design to investigate equilibrium strategies for iterative procurement auctions.
- Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. But Preference elicitation becomes prohibitive even for small instances of multi-unit combinatorial auctions, as suppliers cannot be expected to enumerate a sufficient number of bids that would allow an auctioneer to find the efficient allocation. Auction design for markets with economies of scale and scope are much less well understood. They require more compact and yet expressive bidding languages, and supplier selection typically is a hard computational problem.
Working Papers
Selected Publications
Courses
SS12: Übungsleiter zu Planen und Entscheiden in betrieblichen Informationssysteme
WS 11/12: "Auction Theory and Market Design"
WS 11/12: "FIM Workshop Internetbasierte Geschäftssysteme"
SS11: Übung zu Planen und Entscheiden in betrieblichen Informationssysteme
SS11: Proseminar Decision Support Systems
WS 11/12: "Auction Theory and Market Design"
WS 11/12: "FIM Workshop Internetbasierte Geschäftssysteme"
SS11: Übung zu Planen und Entscheiden in betrieblichen Informationssysteme
SS11: Proseminar Decision Support Systems