M. Bichler, K. Guler, and S. Mayer. Split-award procurement auctions: Can Bayesian equilibrium strategies predict human bidding behavior in multi-object auctions? Production and Operations Management, 24(6):1012–1027, June 2015. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, J. Goeree, S. Mayer, and P. Shabalin. Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales. Telecommunications Policy, 38:613–622, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and J. Wolf. Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs. Experimental Economics, 16(4):511–545, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and G. Ziegler. Efficiency with linear prices? A theoretical and experimental analysis of the combinatorial clock auction. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24(2):394–417, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: An experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design. Experimental Economics, 15(4):667–692, 2012. [ link | pdf ]

T. Scheffel, A. Pikovsky, M. Bichler, and K. Guler. An experimental comparison of linear and non-linear price combinatorial auctions. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 22(2):346–368, 2011. [ link | pdf ]