F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Greger, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong. Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule. 2021. Working paper. [ pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, D. Peters, and C. Stricker. Distribution rules under dichotomous preferences: Two out of three ain't bad. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), 2021. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Stricker. An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes. Social Choice and Welfare, 2021. Forthcoming. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker. Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties. 2020. Working paper. [ pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong. Donor coordination: Collective distribution of individual contributions. In Proceedings of the AAMAS Workshop on Games, Agents, and Incentives, 2019. [ pdf | venue ]

F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker. Voting with ties: Strong impossibilities via SAT solving. In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1285–1293, 2018. [ link | pdf | venue ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Stricker. An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes. In Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 114–120, 2018. [ link | pdf | venue ]

C. Stricker. How frequently do social decision schemes violate desirable properties? Master's thesis, Technische Universität München, 2017.