A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, and J. K. Goeree. Synergistic valuations and efficiency in spectrum auctions. Telecommunications Policy, 42(1):91 – 105, 2018. [ DOI | pdf | http ]

M. Bichler and J. K. Goeree. Frontiers in spectrum auction design. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50:372–391, 2017. [ DOI | link ]

C. Kroemer, M. Bichler, and A. Goetzendorff. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions. INFORMS Group Decision and Negotiation, 25(1):31–63, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, J. Goeree, S. Mayer, and P. Shabalin. Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales. Telecommunications Policy, 38:613–622, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and J. Wolf. Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs. Experimental Economics, 16(4):511–545, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: An experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design. Experimental Economics, 15(4):667–692, 2012. [ link | pdf ]