M. Bichler, N. Kohring, M. Oberlechner, and F. Pieroth.
Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games.
European Journal on Operational Research, 275(1):1–30, 2023.
[ pdf ]
G. Schwarz and M. Bichler.
How to trade thirty thousand products: A wholesale market design
for road capacity.
Transportation Research Part A, 164:167–185, October 2022.
[ DOI |
link ]
M. Bichler, S. Heidekrueger, and N. Kohring.
Learning equilibria in asymmetric auction games.
INFORMS Journal on Computing, to appear, August 2022.
[ link ]
M. Bichler, P. Gritzmann, P. Karaenke, and M. Ritter.
On airport time slot auctions: A market design complying with
the IATA scheduling guidelines.
Transportation Science, to appear, August 2022.
[ DOI |
link ]
E. Baldwin, M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and P. Klemperer.
Strong substitutes: structural properties, and a new algorithm
for competitive equilibrium prices.
Mathematical Programming, 191(2):1436–4646, 2022.
[ DOI |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, H. Buhl, K. Ebinger, K. Ganz, L. Hanny, T. Kern, J. Knörr,
K. Neuhoff, S. Ober, M. Ott, J. Richstein, A. Sitzmann, M. Weibelzahl, and
P. Zilke.
Ein strommarktdesign 2030–2050 zur schaffung von langfristigen
anreizen für energieflexibilität.
In Energieflexibilität in der deutschen Industrie - Band 2:
Markt- und Stromsystem, Managementsysteme und Technologien energieflexibler
Fabriken. Fraunhofer Verlag, 2022.
M. S. Ahunbay, A. Ashour Novirdoust, R. Bhuiyan, M. Bichler, S. Bindu,
E. Bjørndal, M. Bjørndal, H. U. Buhl, J. P. Chaves-Ávila, H. Gerard,
S. Gross, L. Hanny, J. Knörr, C. S. Köhnen, L. Marques, A. Monti,
K. Neuhoff, C. Neumann, E. Ocenic, M. Ott, M. Pichlmeier, J. C. Richstein,
M. Rinck, F. Röhrich, P. M. Röhrig, A. Sauer, J. Strüker,
M. Troncia, J. Wagner, M. Weibelzahl, and P. Zilke.
Electricity market design 2030-2050: Shaping future electricity
markets for a climate-neutral europe.
2022.
[ DOI ]
M. Bichler, J. Knörr, and F. Maldonado.
Pricing in non-convex markets: How to price electricity in the
presence of demand response.
Information Systems Research, to appear, July 2022.
[ DOI |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, H. U. Buhl, J. Knörr, F. Maldonado, P. Schott, S. Waldherr, and
M. Weibelzahl.
Electricity markets in a time of change: A call to arms for
business research.
Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 74:77–102, 2022.
[ DOI |
link ]
M. Bichler, P. Milgrom, and G. Schwarz.
Taming the communication and computation complexity of
combinatorial auctions: The FUEL bid language.
Management Science, to appear, June 2022.
[ DOI |
link |
pdf ]
E. Batziou, M. Bichler, and M. Fichtl.
Core-stability in assignment markets with financially
constrained buyers.
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 23, 2022.
[ DOI |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, S. Heidekrüger, N. Kohring, and P. Sutterer.
Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial
neural networks.
Nature Machine Intelligence, 3:687–695, August 2021.
[ DOI |
link |
pdf ]
A. Ashour Novirdoust, M. Bichler, C. Bojung, H. U. Buhl, G. Fridgen,
V. Gretschko, L. Hanny, J. Knörr, F. Maldonado, K. Neuhoff, C. Neumann,
M. Ott, J. C. Richstein, M. Rinck, M. Schöpf, P. Schott, A. Sitzmann,
J. Wagner, J. Wagner, and M. Weibelzahl.
Electricity spot market design 2030-2050.
2021.
[ DOI ]
A. Ashour Novirdoust, R. Bhuiyan, M. Bichler, H. U. Buhl, G. Fridgen,
C. Fugger, V. Gretschko, L. Hanny, J. Knörr, K. Neuhoff, C. Neumann,
M. Ott, J. C. Richstein, M. Rinck, F. Röhrich, M. Schöpf, A. Sitzmann,
J. Wagner, and M. Weibelzahl.
Electricity market design 2030-2050: Moving towards
implementation.
2021.
[ DOI ]
M. Bichler and S. Merting.
Randomized scheduling mechanisms: Assigning course seats in a
fair and efficient way.
Production and Operations Management, 30(10):3540–3559,
October 2021.
[ DOI |
link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler and S. Waldherr.
Core-pricing in combinatorial exchanges with financially
constrained buyers: Computational hardness and algorithmic solutions.
Operations Research, 70(1):241–264, November 2021.
[ DOI |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, R. Littmann, and S. Waldherr.
Trading airport time slots: Market design with complex
constraints.
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 145:118–133,
March 2021.
[ DOI |
pdf ]
H. Gimpel, L. Hanny, M. Ott, J. Wagner, M. Weibelzahl, M. Bichler, and S. Ober.
Market success: The quest for the objectives and success factors
of markets.
In G. H. et al. (eds), editor, Market Engineering, chapter
Market Engineering, pages 21–44. Springer International Publishing, 2021.
[ DOI ]
M. Bichler.
Der Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 2020 und seine
Bezüge zum Operations Research.
OR News, 69(3), 2020.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler.
Comments on: Shared resources in collaborative vehicle routing.
TOP, 28:21–24, April 2020.
[ DOI ]
M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and G. Schwarz.
Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide
to the literature.
Naval Research Logistics, 68(4):496–513, 2020.
[ DOI ]
M. Bichler, V. Grimm, S. Kretschmer, and P. Sutterer.
Market design for renewable energy auctions: An analysis of
alternative auction formats.
Energy Economics, 92:104904, October 2020.
[ DOI ]
M. Bichler, Z. Hao, R. Littmann, and S. Waldherr.
Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement.
OR Spectrum, 42(3):965–994, 2020.
[ DOI |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, T. Morrill, and S. Waldherr.
How to assign scarce resources without money: Designing
information systems that are efficient, truthful, and (pretty) fair.
INFORMS Information Systems Research, 32(2):335–355, 2020.
[ DOI |
link |
pdf ]
P. Karaenke, M. Bichler, S. Merting, and S. Minner.
Non-monetary coordination mechanisms for time slot allocation in
warehouse delivery.
European Journal of Operational Research, 286(3):897–907,
2020.
[ DOI |
pdf |
http ]
P. Paulsen, M. Bichler, and G. Kokott.
The beauty of Dutch: Bidding behavior in combinatorial
first-price procurement auctions.
European Journal of Operational Research, 291(2):711–721,
2020.
[ DOI ]
M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree.
Designing environmental markets for trading catch shares.
INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics, 49(5):324–337, 2019.
[ DOI ]
M. Bichler and S. Waldherr.
Competitive equilibria in combinatorial exchanges with
financially constrained buyers: Computational hardness and algorithmic
solutions.
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 20, 2019.
[ pdf ]
P. Karaenke, M. Bichler, and S. Minner.
Coordination is hard: Electronic auction mechanisms for
increased efficiency in transportation logistics.
Management Science, 65(12):5449–5956, 2019.
[ link |
pdf ]
G. Kokott, M. Bichler, and P. Paulsen.
The beauty of Dutch: Ex-post split-award auctions in
procurement markets with diseconomies of scale.
European Journal on Operational Research, 278(1):202–210,
2019.
[ DOI |
pdf ]
P. Sutterer, S. Waldherr, and M. Bichler.
Are truthful bidders paying too much? Efficiency and revenue
in display ad auctions.
ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems,
10(2):1–18, 2019.
[ DOI ]
W. van der Aalst, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl.
Robotic process automation.
Business & Information Systems Engineering, 60(4):269–272,
2018.
[ DOI ]
M. Bichler.
Views on the past, present, and future of business and
information systems engineering.
Business & Information Systems Engineering, 60(6):443–477,
2018.
[ DOI |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, S. Fadaei, and D. Kraft.
A simple and fast algorithm for convex decomposition in
relax-and-round mechanisms.
Computers and Operations Research, 103:277–287, 2018.
[ DOI |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree.
A matter of equality: Linear pricing in combinatorial
exchanges.
INFORMS Information Systems Research, 29(4):1024–1043, 2018.
[ DOI |
link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree.
Designing combinatorial exchanges for the reallocation of
resource rights.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS),
116(3):786–791, 2018.
[ DOI |
link ]
M. Bichler and S. Merting.
Truthfulness in advertising? approximation mechanisms for
knapsack bidders.
European Journal of Operational Research, 270(2):775 – 783,
2018.
[ DOI |
link ]
M. Bichler, S. Merting, and A. Uzunoglu.
Assigning course schedules: About preference elicitation,
fairness, and truthfulness.
CoRR, abs/1812.02630, 2018.
[ arXiv |
link ]
M. Bichler and P. Paulsen.
A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit
auctions.
Games and Economic Behavior, 111:20–40, September 2018.
[ DOI |
link |
pdf ]
A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, and J. K. Goeree.
Synergistic valuations and efficiency in spectrum auctions.
Telecommunications Policy, 42(1):91 – 105, 2018.
[ DOI |
pdf |
http ]
A. Heinzl, W. van der Aalst, and M. Bichler.
Why the community should care about technology-centric journal
rankings.
Business & Information Systems Engineering, 60(2):91–93,
2018.
[ DOI ]
G. Kokott, M. Bichler, and P. Paulsen.
First-price split-award auctions in procurement markets with
economies of scale.
Production and Operations Management, 28(3):721–739, March
2019 2018.
[ DOI |
link |
pdf ]
W. van der Aalst, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl.
Responsible data science.
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 59(5), 2017.
S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch.
Algorithmic economics und operations research.
Informatik Spektrum, 40(2):165–171, 2017.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler and J. K. Goeree.
Frontiers in spectrum auction design.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50:372–391,
2017.
[ DOI |
link ]
M. Bichler, V. Gretschko, and M. Janssen.
Bargaining in spectrum auctions: a review of the german auction
in 2015.
Telecommunications Policy, 41(5-6):325–340, 2017.
[ DOI |
link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, Z. Hao, and G. Adomavicius.
Coalition-based pricing in ascending combinatorial auctions.
Information Systems Research, 28(1):159–179, 2017.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, A. Heinzl, and W. van der Aalst.
Business analytics and data science: Once again?
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 58(2), 2017.
M. Bichler and S. Waldherr.
Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges.
Economics Letters, 157:145 – 147, 2017.
[ DOI |
http ]
F. Diebold and M. Bichler.
Matching with indifferences: A comparison of algorithms in the
context of course allocation.
European Journal of Operational Research, 260(1):268–282,
2017.
[ link |
pdf ]
S. Fadaei and M. Bichler.
Generalized assignment problem: Truthful mechanism design
without money.
Operations Research Letters, 45(1):72–76, 2017.
[ pdf ]
S. Fadaei and M. Bichler.
Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: On the limits of
approximation in combinatorial markets.
European Journal of Operational Research, 260(2):767–777,
2017.
[ link |
pdf ]
S. Fadaei and M. Bichler.
A truthful mechanism for the generalized assignment problem.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 5(3):14,
2017.
[ link |
pdf ]
A. Heinzl, M. Bichler, and W. van der Aalst.
Trans-national joint research projects - defying the odds of
national inter-university competition.
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 59(4), 2017.
A. Heinzl, M. Bichler, and W. van der Aalst.
Trans-national joint research projects.
Business & Information Systems Engineering, 59(4), 2017.
W. van der Aalst, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl.
Open research in business and information systems engineering.
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(6), 2016.
M. Bichler, A. Heinzl, and W. van der Aalst.
Bise and the engineering sciences.
Business & Information Systems Engineering, 58(2), 2016.
K. Guler, M. Bichler, and J. Petrakis.
Ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders.
INFORMS Group Decision and Negotiation, 25(3):609–639, May
2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
A. Heinzl, M. Bichler, and W. van der Aalst.
Disciplinary pluralism, flagship conferences, and journal
submissions.
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 58(4), 2016.
C. Kroemer, M. Bichler, and A. Goetzendorff.
(Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions.
INFORMS Group Decision and Negotiation, 25(1):31–63, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
A. Woke, M. Bichler, F. Chirigati, and V. Steeves.
Reproducible experiments on dynamic resource allocation in cloud
data centers.
Information Systems, 59:98–101, 2016.
[ DOI |
link |
pdf ]
A. Wolke, M. Bichler, and T. Setzer.
Planning vs. dynamic control: Resource allocation in corporate
clouds.
IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, 4(3):322–335, 2016.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, K. Guler, and S. Mayer.
Split-award procurement auctions: Can Bayesian equilibrium
strategies predict human bidding behavior in multi-object auctions?
Production and Operations Management, 24(6):1012–1027, June
2015.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, A. Heinzl, and R. Winter.
Practice impact of IS research.
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(2), 2015.
A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, B. Day, and P. Shabalin.
Compact bid languages and core-pricing in large multi-object
auctions.
Management Science, 61(7):1684 – 1703, 2015.
[ DOI |
link |
pdf ]
A. Heinzl, R. Winter, and M. Bichler.
Internationalization of information systems research and
teaching.
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(4), 2015.
R. Winter, M. Bichler, and A. Heinzl.
Teaching: The little brother of research.
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 57(6), 2015.
A. Woke, B. Tsend-Ayush, C. Pfeiffer, and M. Bichler.
More than bin packing: On dynamic resource allocation strategies
in cloud computing.
Information Systems, 51(C):83–95, 2015.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler.
Reflections on design science research in information systems.
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(1):3, 2014.
M. Bichler, J. Goeree, S. Mayer, and P. Shabalin.
Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales.
Telecommunications Policy, 38:613–622, 2014.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, T. Hass, P. Loos, and R. Krishnan.
Research areas in business and information systems engineering.
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(1):2, 2014.
F. Diebold, H. Aziz, M. Bichler, F. Matthes, and A. Schneider.
Course allocation via stable matching.
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(2):111–125,
2014.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and J. Wolf.
Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to
high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs.
Experimental Economics, 16(4):511–545, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and G. Ziegler.
Efficiency with linear prices? A theoretical and experimental
analysis of the combinatorial clock auction.
INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24(2):394–417, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
C. Hass, M. Bichler, and K. Guler.
Optimization-based decision support for scenario analysis in
sourcing markets with economies of scale and scope.
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 12(3):152–165,
2013.
[ link ]
I. Petrakis, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler.
Ascending combinatorial auctions with allocation constraints:
Game-theoretical and computational properties of generic pricing rules.
INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24(3):768–786, 2013.
[ link |
pdf ]
I. Petrakis, C. Hass, and M. Bichler.
On the impact of real-time information on field service
scheduling.
Decision Support Systems, 53(2):282–293, 2012.
[ link |
pdf ]
T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler.
On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions:
An experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design.
Experimental Economics, 15(4):667–692, 2012.
[ link |
pdf ]
T. Setzer and M. Bichler.
Using matrix approximation for high-dimensional server
allocation problems.
European Journal on Operational Research, 227(1):62–75, 2012.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler and K. Battacharya.
It-service-management und it-automation: Methoden und modelle
für effizienten it-betrieb (editorial).
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 53(1):2, 2011.
M. Bichler, A. Gupta, and W. Ketter.
Designing smart markets.
INFORMS Information Systems Research, 21(4):688–699, 2011.
[ link ]
M. Bichler, S. Schneider, K. Guler, and M. Sayal.
Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets
with economies of scale and scope.
European Journal on Operational Research, 214(1):67–77, 2011.
[ link |
pdf ]
T. Dierkes, M. Bichler, and R. Krishnan.
Estimating the effect of word of mouth on churn and cross-buying
in the mobile phone market with markov logic networks.
Decision Support Systems, 51(3):361–371, 2011.
[ link |
pdf ]
T. Scheffel, A. Pikovsky, M. Bichler, and K. Guler.
An experimental comparison of linear and non-linear price
combinatorial auctions.
INFORMS Information Systems Research, 22(2):346–368, 2011.
[ link |
pdf ]
M. Bichler.
Combinatorial auctions: Complexity and algorithms.
In Wiley Encyclopedia on Operations Research and Management
Science. Wiley, Fall 2010.
[ link |
pdf ]
O. Hühn, C. Markl, and M. Bichler.
On the predictive performance of queueing network models for
large-scale distributed transaction processing systems.
Information Technology & Management, 2-3:135–149, 2010.
[ link |
pdf ]
C. Markl, O. Hühn, and M. Bichler.
Short-term performance management by priority-based queueing.
Service Oriented Computing and Applications, Springer Verlag,
3(1):169–180, 2010.
[ link |
pdf ]
S. Schneider, P. Shabalin, and M. Bichler.
On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial
auctions.
European Journal on Operational Research, 206(1):248–259,
2010.
[ link |
pdf ]
B. Speitkamp and M. Bichler.
A mathematical programming approach for server consolidation
problems in virtualized data centers.
IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, 3(4):266–278, 2010.
[ link |
pdf ]