G. Schwarz and M. Bichler. How to trade thirty thousand products: A wholesale market design for road capacity. Transportation Research Part A, 164:167–185, October 2022. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, S. Heidekrueger, and N. Kohring. Learning equilibria in asymmetric auction games. INFORMS Journal on Computing, to appear, August 2022. [ link ]

M. Bichler, P. Gritzmann, P. Karaenke, and M. Ritter. On airport time slot auctions: A market design complying with the IATA scheduling guidelines. Transportation Science, to appear, August 2022. [ DOI | link ]

M. Fichtl. On the expressiveness of assignment messages. Economics Letters, 208:110051, 2021. [ DOI | http ]
In this note we prove that the class of valuation functions representable via integer assignment messages is a proper subset of strong substitutes valuations. Thus, there are strong substitutes valuations not expressible via assignment messages.

M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, S. Heidekrüger, N. Kohring, and P. Sutterer. Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks. Nature Machine Intelligence, 3:687–695, August 2021. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler. Der Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 2020 und seine Bezüge zum Operations Research. OR News, 69(3), 2020. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and G. Schwarz. Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature. Naval Research Logistics, 68(4):496–513, 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, V. Grimm, S. Kretschmer, and P. Sutterer. Market design for renewable energy auctions: An analysis of alternative auction formats. Energy Economics, 92:104904, October 2020. [ DOI ]

P. Paulsen, M. Bichler, and G. Kokott. The beauty of Dutch: Bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions. European Journal of Operational Research, 291(2):711–721, 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. Designing environmental markets for trading catch shares. INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics, 49(5):324–337, 2019. [ DOI ]

G. Kokott, M. Bichler, and P. Paulsen. The beauty of Dutch: Ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale. European Journal on Operational Research, 278(1):202–210, 2019. [ DOI | pdf ]

P. Sutterer, S. Waldherr, and M. Bichler. Are truthful bidders paying too much? Efficiency and revenue in display ad auctions. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(2):1–18, 2019. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. A matter of equality: Linear pricing in combinatorial exchanges. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 29(4):1024–1043, 2018. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, and J. K. Goeree. Synergistic valuations and efficiency in spectrum auctions. Telecommunications Policy, 42(1):91 – 105, 2018. [ DOI | pdf | http ]

G. Kokott, M. Bichler, and P. Paulsen. First-price split-award auctions in procurement markets with economies of scale. Production and Operations Management, 28(3):721–739, March 2019 2018. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch. Algorithmic economics und operations research. Informatik Spektrum, 40(2):165–171, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, V. Gretschko, and M. Janssen. Bargaining in spectrum auctions: a review of the german auction in 2015. Telecommunications Policy, 41(5-6):325–340, 2017. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, Z. Hao, and G. Adomavicius. Coalition-based pricing in ascending combinatorial auctions. Information Systems Research, 28(1):159–179, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

F. Diebold and M. Bichler. Matching with indifferences: A comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation. European Journal of Operational Research, 260(1):268–282, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: On the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets. European Journal of Operational Research, 260(2):767–777, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, B. Day, and P. Shabalin. Compact bid languages and core-pricing in large multi-object auctions. Management Science, 61(7):1684 – 1703, 2015. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

C. Hass, M. Bichler, and K. Guler. Optimization-based decision support for scenario analysis in sourcing markets with economies of scale and scope. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 12(3):152–165, 2013. [ link ]

M. Bichler, A. Gupta, and W. Ketter. Designing smart markets. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 21(4):688–699, 2011. [ link ]

M. Bichler, S. Schneider, K. Guler, and M. Sayal. Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope. European Journal on Operational Research, 214(1):67–77, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

S. Schneider, P. Shabalin, and M. Bichler. On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions. European Journal on Operational Research, 206(1):248–259, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, A. Pikovsky, and T. Setzer. An analysis of design problems in combinatorial procurement auctions. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 51(1), 2009. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and A. Pikovsky. A computational analysis of linear price iterative combinatorial auction formats. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 20(1):33–59, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and J. Kalagnanam. Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions. European Journal of Operational Research, 160(2):380–394, 2005. [ link | pdf ]