F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Stricker. An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes. Social Choice and Welfare, 2021. Forthcoming. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl and F. Brandt. Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences. Econometrica, 88(2):799–844, 2020. [ link | pdf ]

G. Bachmeier, F. Brandt, C. Geist, P. Harrenstein, K. Kardel, D. Peters, and H. G. Seedig. k-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 105:130–157, 2019. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer. Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive results and computer-generated impossibilities. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 66:1031–1056, 2019. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl and F. Brandt. Justifying optimal play via consistency. Theoretical Economics, 14:1185–1201, 2019. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, M. Olsen, and D. Peters. Fractional hedonic games. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(2):1–29, 2019. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Welfare maximization entices participation. Games and Economic Behavior, 14:308–314, 2019. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, H. G. Seedig, and W. Suksompong. On the structure of stable tournament solutions. Economic Theory, 65(2):483–507, 2018. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Eberl, and C. Geist. Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving. Journal of the ACM, 65(2):1–28, 2018. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Extending tournament solutions. Social Choice and Welfare, 51(2):193–222, 2018. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness. Games and Economic Behavior, 110:1–18, 2018. [ link | pdf ]

S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch. Algorithmic Economics und Operations Research. Informatik Spektrum, 40(2):165–171, 2017. Special Issue “50 Jahre Informatik München”. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters. Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving. Mathematical Social Sciences, 90:18–27, 2017. Special Issue in Honor of Hervé Moulin. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig. Minimal extending sets in tournaments. Mathematical Social Sciences, 87:55–63, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and W. Suksompong. The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences. Economics Letters, 141:44–47, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Consistent probabilistic social choice. Econometrica, 84(5):1839–1880, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, and W. Suksompong. An ordinal minimax theorem. Games and Economic Behavior, 95:107–112, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and C. Geist. Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 55:565–602, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and M. Brill. Computing dominance-based solution concepts. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 5(2):1–22, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, C. Geist, and P. Harrenstein. A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality. Social Choice and Welfare, 46(1):81–91, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 53:439–496, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 60:123–133, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, A. Dau, and H. G. Seedig. Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 187:41–49, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt. Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness. Social Choice and Welfare, 45(4):793–804, 2015. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, M. Brill, and J. Mestre. Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 13(2):26–30, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. Social Choice and Welfare, 42(3):551–574, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. Artificial Intelligence, 195:316–334, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Pareto optimality in coalition formation. Games and Economic Behavior, 82:562–581, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the rate of convergence of fictitious play. Theory of Computing Systems, 53(1):41–52, 2013. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. [ link | pdf ]

D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe. The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets. Theory of Computing Systems, 53(3):467–502, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship. Economics Letters, 121(3):341–345, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Chudnovsky, I. Kim, G. Liu, S. Norin, A. Scott, P. Seymour, and S. Thomassé. A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz. Social Choice and Welfare, 40(3):739–743, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):162–181, 2011. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann. The computational complexity of weak saddles. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):139–161, 2011. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries. Theoretical Computer Science, 412:675–685, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt. Minimal stable sets in tournaments. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1481–1499, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(4):1721–1731, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair. A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. Social Choice and Welfare, 34(4):597–609, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games. Theory and Decision, 69(2):233–256, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 75(3):163–177, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. The computational complexity of choice sets. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):444–459, 2009. Special Issue on Computational Social Choice. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt. Some remarks on Dodgson's voting rule. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55(4):460–463, 2009. Special Issue on Computational Social Choice. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and J. Hoffmann. Computing Shapley's saddles. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 8(2), 2009. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham. Ranking games. Artificial Intelligence, 173(2):221–239, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. On the existence of unconditionally privacy-preserving auction protocols. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 11(2), 2008. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt and F. Fischer. Computing the minimal covering set. Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(2):254–268, 2008. [ link | pdf ]

F. Brandt. How to obtain full privacy in auctions. International Journal of Information Security, 5(4):201–216, 2006. [ link | pdf ]