G. Schwarz and M. Bichler. How to trade thirty thousand products: A wholesale market design for road capacity. Transportation Research Part A, 164:167–185, October 2022. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, S. Heidekrueger, and N. Kohring. Learning equilibria in asymmetric auction games. INFORMS Journal on Computing, to appear, August 2022. [ link ]

M. Bichler, P. Gritzmann, P. Karaenke, and M. Ritter. On airport time slot auctions: A market design complying with the IATA scheduling guidelines. Transportation Science, to appear, August 2022. [ DOI | link ]

E. Baldwin, M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and P. Klemperer. Strong substitutes: structural properties, and a new algorithm for competitive equilibrium prices. Mathematical Programming, 191(2):1436–4646, 2022. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, J. Knörr, and F. Maldonado. Pricing in non-convex markets: How to price electricity in the presence of demand response. Information Systems Research, to appear, July 2022. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Milgrom, and G. Schwarz. Taming the communication and computation complexity of combinatorial auctions: The FUEL bid language. Management Science, to appear, June 2022. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

E. Batziou, M. Bichler, and M. Fichtl. Core-stability in assignment markets with financially constrained buyers. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 23, 2022. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Fichtl. On the expressiveness of assignment messages. Economics Letters, 208:110051, 2021. [ DOI | http ]
In this note we prove that the class of valuation functions representable via integer assignment messages is a proper subset of strong substitutes valuations. Thus, there are strong substitutes valuations not expressible via assignment messages.

M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, S. Heidekrüger, N. Kohring, and P. Sutterer. Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks. Nature Machine Intelligence, 3:687–695, August 2021. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and S. Merting. Randomized scheduling mechanisms: Assigning course seats in a fair and efficient way. Production and Operations Management, 30(10):3540–3559, October 2021. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and S. Waldherr. Core-pricing in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: Computational hardness and algorithmic solutions. Operations Research, 70(1):241–264, November 2021. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler. Der Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 2020 und seine Bezüge zum Operations Research. OR News, 69(3), 2020. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, M. Fichtl, and G. Schwarz. Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature. Naval Research Logistics, 68(4):496–513, 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, V. Grimm, S. Kretschmer, and P. Sutterer. Market design for renewable energy auctions: An analysis of alternative auction formats. Energy Economics, 92:104904, October 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, Z. Hao, R. Littmann, and S. Waldherr. Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement. OR Spectrum, 42(3):965–994, 2020. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, T. Morrill, and S. Waldherr. How to assign scarce resources without money: Designing information systems that are efficient, truthful, and (pretty) fair. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 32(2):335–355, 2020. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

P. Paulsen, M. Bichler, and G. Kokott. The beauty of Dutch: Bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions. European Journal of Operational Research, 291(2):711–721, 2020. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. Designing environmental markets for trading catch shares. INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics, 49(5):324–337, 2019. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler and S. Waldherr. Competitive equilibria in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: Computational hardness and algorithmic solutions. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 20, 2019. [ pdf ]

G. Kokott, M. Bichler, and P. Paulsen. The beauty of Dutch: Ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale. European Journal on Operational Research, 278(1):202–210, 2019. [ DOI | pdf ]

P. Sutterer, S. Waldherr, and M. Bichler. Are truthful bidders paying too much? Efficiency and revenue in display ad auctions. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(2):1–18, 2019. [ DOI ]

M. Bichler, S. Fadaei, and D. Kraft. A simple and fast algorithm for convex decomposition in relax-and-round mechanisms. Computers and Operations Research, 103:277–287, 2018. [ DOI | pdf ]

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. A matter of equality: Linear pricing in combinatorial exchanges. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 29(4):1024–1043, 2018. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, V. Fux, and J. Goeree. Designing combinatorial exchanges for the reallocation of resource rights. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), 116(3):786–791, 2018. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler and S. Merting. Truthfulness in advertising? approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders. European Journal of Operational Research, 270(2):775 – 783, 2018. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler and P. Paulsen. A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 111:20–40, September 2018. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, and J. K. Goeree. Synergistic valuations and efficiency in spectrum auctions. Telecommunications Policy, 42(1):91 – 105, 2018. [ DOI | pdf | http ]

G. Kokott, M. Bichler, and P. Paulsen. First-price split-award auctions in procurement markets with economies of scale. Production and Operations Management, 28(3):721–739, March 2019 2018. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch. Algorithmic economics und operations research. Informatik Spektrum, 40(2):165–171, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and J. K. Goeree. Frontiers in spectrum auction design. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50:372–391, 2017. [ DOI | link ]

M. Bichler, V. Gretschko, and M. Janssen. Bargaining in spectrum auctions: a review of the german auction in 2015. Telecommunications Policy, 41(5-6):325–340, 2017. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, Z. Hao, and G. Adomavicius. Coalition-based pricing in ascending combinatorial auctions. Information Systems Research, 28(1):159–179, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and S. Waldherr. Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges. Economics Letters, 157:145 – 147, 2017. [ DOI | http ]

F. Diebold and M. Bichler. Matching with indifferences: A comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation. European Journal of Operational Research, 260(1):268–282, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. Generalized assignment problem: Truthful mechanism design without money. Operations Research Letters, 45(1):72–76, 2017. [ pdf ]

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: On the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets. European Journal of Operational Research, 260(2):767–777, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

S. Fadaei and M. Bichler. A truthful mechanism for the generalized assignment problem. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 5(3):14, 2017. [ link | pdf ]

K. Guler, M. Bichler, and J. Petrakis. Ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders. INFORMS Group Decision and Negotiation, 25(3):609–639, May 2016. [ link | pdf ]

C. Kroemer, M. Bichler, and A. Goetzendorff. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions. INFORMS Group Decision and Negotiation, 25(1):31–63, 2016. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, K. Guler, and S. Mayer. Split-award procurement auctions: Can Bayesian equilibrium strategies predict human bidding behavior in multi-object auctions? Production and Operations Management, 24(6):1012–1027, June 2015. [ link | pdf ]

A. Goetzendorff, M. Bichler, B. Day, and P. Shabalin. Compact bid languages and core-pricing in large multi-object auctions. Management Science, 61(7):1684 – 1703, 2015. [ DOI | link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, J. Goeree, S. Mayer, and P. Shabalin. Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales. Telecommunications Policy, 38:613–622, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

F. Diebold, H. Aziz, M. Bichler, F. Matthes, and A. Schneider. Course allocation via stable matching. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 56(2):111–125, 2014. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and J. Wolf. Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs. Experimental Economics, 16(4):511–545, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and G. Ziegler. Efficiency with linear prices? A theoretical and experimental analysis of the combinatorial clock auction. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24(2):394–417, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

C. Hass, M. Bichler, and K. Guler. Optimization-based decision support for scenario analysis in sourcing markets with economies of scale and scope. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 12(3):152–165, 2013. [ link ]

I. Petrakis, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. Ascending combinatorial auctions with allocation constraints: Game-theoretical and computational properties of generic pricing rules. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 24(3):768–786, 2013. [ link | pdf ]

T. Scheffel, G. Ziegler, and M. Bichler. On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: An experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design. Experimental Economics, 15(4):667–692, 2012. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, A. Gupta, and W. Ketter. Designing smart markets. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 21(4):688–699, 2011. [ link ]

M. Bichler, S. Schneider, K. Guler, and M. Sayal. Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope. European Journal on Operational Research, 214(1):67–77, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

T. Dierkes, M. Bichler, and R. Krishnan. Estimating the effect of word of mouth on churn and cross-buying in the mobile phone market with markov logic networks. Decision Support Systems, 51(3):361–371, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

T. Scheffel, A. Pikovsky, M. Bichler, and K. Guler. An experimental comparison of linear and non-linear price combinatorial auctions. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 22(2):346–368, 2011. [ link | pdf ]

S. Schneider, P. Shabalin, and M. Bichler. On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions. European Journal on Operational Research, 206(1):248–259, 2010. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, A. Pikovsky, and T. Setzer. An analysis of design problems in combinatorial procurement auctions. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 51(1), 2009. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, P. Shabalin, and A. Pikovsky. A computational analysis of linear price iterative combinatorial auction formats. INFORMS Information Systems Research, 20(1):33–59, 2009. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler. Kombinatorische Online-Verhandlung bei Audi - Wie Aristoteles irrte. Beschaffung aktuell, 9, 2008.

M. Bichler and J. Kalagnanam. Software frameworks for advanced procurement auction markets. Communications of the ACM (CACM), 49(12):104–108, 2006. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and J. Kalagnanam. A non-parametric estimator for setting reservation prices in procurement auctions. Information Technology and Management, 7(3):157–169, 2006. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler and R. Steinberg. E-auctions in procurement operations. Production and Operations Management, 2006.

M. Bichler and J. Kalagnanam. Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions. European Journal of Operational Research, 160(2):380–394, 2005. [ link | pdf ]

M. Bichler, A. Pikovsky, and T. Setzer. Kombinatorische auktionen in der betrieblichen beschaffung - eine analyse grundlegender entwurfsprobleme. Wirtschaftsinformatik, 47(2), 2005. [ link | pdf ]