

Curriculum Vitae

Personal

Name: **Felix Brandt**
Date of birth: June 6, 1973 (Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany)
Marital status: Married, two children
Address: Department of Informatics (I18)
Technical University of Munich
Boltzmannstr. 3
85748 Garching, Germany
Email: brandt@tum.de
Homepage: <http://dss.in.tum.de/staff/brandt>

Research Positions

2010– **Professor (Technische Universität München (TUM), Germany)**
Decision Sciences and Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory Group
2005–2010 **Junior research group leader¹ (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU), Germany)**
Preference Aggregation in Multiagent Systems Group
2004–2005 **Post-doctoral research fellow (Stanford University, USA)**
Multiagent Group (Prof. Yoav Shoham, Ph.D.)
2003–2004 **Post-doctoral research fellow (Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), USA)**
Agent-Mediated Electronic Marketplaces Group (Prof. Tuomas Sandholm, Ph.D.)
1999–2003 **Graduate student and research assistant (TUM)**
Chair for Theoretical Computer Science and Foundations of Artificial Intelligence
(Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Wilfried Brauer)

Education

January 2010 **Habilitation, Computer Science (LMU)**
Thesis title: *“Tournament Solutions – Extensions of Maximality and their Applications to Decision-Making”*
Referees: Prof. M. Hofmann, Ph.D., Prof. J.-F. Laslier, Prof. Dr. M. Schottenloher
August 2003 **Doctoral degree², Computer Science, *summa cum laude* (TUM)**
Thesis title: *“Fundamental Aspects of Privacy and Deception in Electronic Auctions”*
Thesis committee: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. W. Brauer (advisor), Prof. Dr. M. Bichler
August 1998 **Diploma³, Computer Science (TUM)**
Major: Computer Science, minor: Mathematics
Thesis title: *“Example Selection for Learning in Automated Theorem Proving”*

¹equivalent to Assistant Professorship

²equivalent to Ph.D.

³equivalent to Master’s degree (Bachelor included)

Editorial Positions

2014–2017	Associate Editor: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
2011–	Associate Editor: Social Choice and Welfare
2011–	Associate Editor: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
2010–	Associate Editor: Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
2008–2016	Associate Editor: Mathematical Social Sciences
2013–	Editorial Board Member: Intelligent Systems book series

Books

1. F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. Procaccia, editors. *Handbook of Computational Social Choice*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Book Chapters

7. F. Brandt. Collective choice lotteries: Dealing with randomization in economic design. In J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W. S. Zwicker, editors, *The Future of Economic Design*. Springer-Verlag, 2018. Forthcoming.
6. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, E. Elkind, and P. Skowron. Computational social choice: The first ten years and beyond. In B. Steffen and G. Woeginger, editors, *Volume 10,000*, volume 10000 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*. Springer-Verlag, 2018. Forthcoming.
5. F. Brandt. Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social choice. In U. Endriss, editor, *Trends in Computational Social Choice*, chapter 1, pages 3–26. AI Access, 2017.
4. F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia. Introduction to computational social choice. In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia, editors, *Handbook of Computational Social Choice*, chapter 1. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
3. F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Tournament solutions. In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia, editors, *Handbook of Computational Social Choice*, chapter 3. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
2. F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, and U. Endriss. Computational social choice. In G. Weiß, editor, *Multiagent Systems*, chapter 6, pages 213–283. MIT Press, 2nd edition, 2013.
1. F. Brandt. Auctions. In B. Rosenberg, editor, *Handbook of Financial Cryptography and Security*, chapter 2, pages 49–58. CRC Press, 2010.

Journal Articles

40. F. Brandt, M. Brill, H. G. Seedig, and W. Suksompong. On the structure of stable tournament solutions. *Economic Theory*, 2018. Forthcoming.
39. F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Extending tournament solutions. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 2018. Forthcoming.

38. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, M. Eberl, and C. Geist. Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving. *Journal of the ACM*, 2018. Forthcoming.
37. H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 2018. Forthcoming.
36. F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig. Minimal extending sets in tournaments. *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 87:55–63, 2017.
35. F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters. Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving. *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 90:18–27, 2017. Special Issue in Honor of Hervé Moulin.
34. S. Albers, M. Bichler, F. Brandt, P. Gritzmann, and R. Kolisch. Algorithmic Economics und Operations Research. *Informatik Spektrum*, 40(2):165–171, 2017. Special Issue “50 Jahre Informatik München”.
33. F. Brandt, C. Geist, and P. Harrenstein. A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 46(1):81–91, 2016.
32. F. Brandt and C. Geist. Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving. *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research*, 55:565–602, 2016.
31. F. Brandt, M. Brill, and W. Suksompong. An ordinal minimax theorem. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 95:107–112, 2016.
30. F. Brandt and M. Brill. Computing dominance-based solution concepts. *ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation*, 5(2), 2016.
29. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and W. Suksompong. The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences. *Economics Letters*, 141:44–47, 2016.
28. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Consistent probabilistic social choice. *Econometrica*, 84(5):1839–1880, 2016.
27. F. Brandt, A. Dau, and H. G. Seedig. Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions. *Discrete Applied Mathematics*, 187:41–49, 2015.
26. F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research*, 53:439–496, 2015.
25. F. Brandt. Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 45(4):793–804, 2015.
24. H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 60:123–133, 2015.
23. F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 42(3):551–574, 2014.
22. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, M. Brill, and J. Mestre. Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship. *ACM SIGecom Exchanges*, 13(2):26–30, 2014.
21. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the rate of convergence of fictitious play. *Theory of Computing Systems*, 53(1):41–52, 2013. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.

20. F. Brandt, M. Chudnovsky, I. Kim, G. Liu, S. Norin, A. Scott, P. Seymour, and S. Thomassé. A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 40(3):739–743, 2013.
19. D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe. The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets. *Theory of Computing Systems*, 53(3):467–502, 2013.
18. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. *Artificial Intelligence*, 195:316–334, 2013.
17. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Pareto optimality in coalition formation. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 82:562–581, 2013.
16. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship. *Economics Letters*, 121(3):341–345, 2013.
15. F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 146(4):1721–1731, 2011.
14. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries. *Theoretical Computer Science*, 412:675–685, 2011.
13. F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann. The computational complexity of weak saddles. *Theory of Computing Systems*, 49(1):139–161, 2011. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.
12. F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games. *Theory of Computing Systems*, 49(1):162–181, 2011. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.
11. F. Brandt. Minimal stable sets in tournaments. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 146(4):1481–1499, 2011.
10. F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games. *Theory and Decision*, 69(2):233–256, 2010.
9. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair. A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 34(4):597–609, 2010.
8. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. *Journal of Computer and System Sciences*, 75(3):163–177, 2009.
7. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham. Ranking games. *Artificial Intelligence*, 173(2):221–239, 2009.
6. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. The computational complexity of choice sets. *Mathematical Logic Quarterly*, 55(4):444–459, 2009. Special Issue on Computational Social Choice.
5. F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and J. Hoffmann. Computing Shapley’s saddles. *ACM SIGecom Exchanges*, 8(2), 2009.
4. F. Brandt. Some remarks on Dodgson’s voting rule. *Mathematical Logic Quarterly*, 55(4):460–463, 2009. Special Issue on Computational Social Choice.
3. F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. On the existence of unconditionally privacy-preserving auction protocols. *ACM Transactions on Information and System Security*, 11(2), 2008.

2. F. Brandt and F. Fischer. Computing the minimal covering set. *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 56(2):254–268, 2008.
1. F. Brandt. How to obtain full privacy in auctions. *International Journal of Information Security*, 5(4):201–216, 2006.

Publications in Highly Refereed Conference Proceedings

60. F. Brandt, C. Saile, and C. Stricker. Voting with ties: Strong impossibilities via SAT solving. In *Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, **Acceptance rate: 25%**, 2018. Forthcoming.
59. F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Suderland. Majority graphs of assignment problems and properties of popular random assignments. In *Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 335–343. **Acceptance rate: 26%**, IFAAMAS, 2017.
58. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Random assignment with optional participation. In *Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 326–334. **Acceptance rate: 26%**, IFAAMAS, 2017.
57. F. Brandt, C. Geist, and M. Strobel. Analyzing the practical relevance of voting paradoxes via Ehrhart theory, computer simulations, and empirical data. In *Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 385–393. **Acceptance rate: 24%**, IFAAMAS, 2016.
56. F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters. Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving. In *Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 314–322. **Acceptance rate: 24%**, IFAAMAS, 2016.
55. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Geist. Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving. In *Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)*, pages 116–122. **Acceptance rate: 24%**, AAAI Press, 2016.
54. F. Brandt, G. Chabin, and C. Geist. Pnyx: A powerful and user-friendly tool for preference aggregation. In *Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 1915–1916. **Demonstration paper acceptance rate: 75%**, IFAAMAS, 2015.
53. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Strobel. Fractional hedonic games: Individual and group stability. In *Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 1219–1227. **Acceptance rate: 25%**, IFAAMAS, 2015.
52. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Incentives for participation and abstention in probabilistic social choice. In *Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 1411–1419. **Acceptance rate: 25%**, IFAAMAS, 2015.
51. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer. Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive results and computer-generated impossibilities. In *Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)*, pages 18–24. **Acceptance rate: 28%**, AAAI Press, 2015.

50. F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, and H. G. Seedig. Minimal extending sets in tournaments. In *Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 1539–1540. **Short paper acceptance rate: 46%**, IFAAMAS, 2014.
49. F. Brandt and C. Geist. Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving. In *Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 1193–1200. **Acceptance rate: 23%**, IFAAMAS, 2014.
48. F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Extending tournament solutions. In *Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*, pages 580–586. **Acceptance rate: 28%**, AAAI Press, 2014.
47. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Fractional hedonic games. In *Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 5–12. **Acceptance rate: 23%**, IFAAMAS, 2014.
46. H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. In *Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC)*, pages 331–332. **Acceptance rate: 27%**, ACM Press, 2014.
45. H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. On the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in randomized social choice. In *Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*, pages 545–551. **Acceptance rate: 28%**, AAAI Press, 2014.
44. F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, K. Kardel, and H. G. Seedig. It only takes a few: On the hardness of voting with a constant number of agents. In *Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 375–382. **Acceptance rate: 22%**, IFAAMAS, 2013.
43. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Stursberg. On popular random assignments. In *Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)*, volume 8146 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*, pages 183–194. **Acceptance rate: 38%**, Springer-Verlag, 2013.
42. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and strategyproofness in randomized social choice. In *Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 455–462. **Acceptance rate: 22%**, IFAAMAS, 2013.
41. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship. In *Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)*, volume 8289 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*, pages 24–25. **Acceptance rate: 24%**, Springer-Verlag, 2013.
40. F. Brandt and M. Brill. Computing dominance-based solution concepts. In *Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC)*, page 233. **Acceptance rate: 33%**, ACM Press, 2012.
39. F. Brandt, M. Brill, and H. G. Seedig. On the fixed-parameter tractability of composition-consistent tournament solutions. In *Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)*, pages 85–90. **Oral presentation acceptance rate: 17%**, AAAI Press, 2011.
38. F. Brandt and M. Brill. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of irresolute social choice functions. In *Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical*

- Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK)*, pages 136–142. **Plenary presentation acceptance rate: 27%**, ACM Press, 2011.
37. F. Brandt. Group-strategyproof irresolute social choice functions. In *Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)*, pages 79–84. **Oral presentation acceptance rate: 17%**, AAAI Press, 2011.
 36. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. In *Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 183–190. **Acceptance rate: 22%**, IFAAMAS, 2011.
 35. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games. In *Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)*, pages 43–48. **Acceptance rate: 30%**, AAAI Press, 2011.
 34. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Pareto optimality in coalition formation. In *Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)*, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 93–104. **Acceptance rate: 40%**, Springer-Verlag, 2011.
 33. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. On iterated dominance, matrix elimination, and matched paths. In *Proceedings of the 27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS)*, Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 107–118. **Acceptance rate: 23%**, LZI, 2010.
 32. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the rate of convergence of fictitious play. In *Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)*, number 6386 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 102–113. **Acceptance rate: 45%**, Springer-Verlag, 2010.
 31. F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. In *Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*, pages 715–722. **Acceptance rate: 26%**, AAAI Press, 2010.
 30. F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. In *Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 47–54. **Acceptance rate: 23%**, IFAAMAS, 2010.
 29. D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe. The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets. In *Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC)*, number 6078 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 299–310. **Acceptance rate: 26%**, Springer-Verlag, 2010.
 28. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Monotone cooperative games and their threshold versions. In *Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 1017–1024. **Acceptance rate: 23%**, IFAAMAS, 2010.
 27. F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and J. Hoffmann. The computational complexity of weak saddles. In *Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)*, volume 5814 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 238–249. **Acceptance rate: 50%**, Springer-Verlag, 2009.
 26. F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games. In *Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium*

- on *Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)*, volume 5814 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*, pages 287–298. **Acceptance rate: 50%**, Springer-Verlag, 2009.
25. F. Brandt, M. Brill, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Computational aspects of Shapley’s saddles. In *Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 209–216. **Full paper acceptance rate: 22%**, IFAAMAS, 2009.
 24. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries. In *Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE)*, volume 5385 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*, pages 198–209. **Acceptance rate: 32%**, Springer-Verlag, 2008.
 23. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair. A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. In *Proceedings of the 23rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*, pages 38–43. **Oral presentation acceptance rate: 24%**, AAAI Press, 2008.
 22. F. Brandt and F. Fischer. On the hardness and existence of quasi-strict equilibria. In *Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)*, volume 4997 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*, pages 291–302. **Acceptance rate: 50%**, Springer-Verlag, 2008.
 21. P. Harrenstein, F. Brandt, and F. Fischer. Commitment and extortion. In *Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 108–115. **Oral presentation acceptance rate: 22%**, IFAAMAS, 2007.
 20. F. Brandt, T. Sandholm, and Y. Shoham. Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions. In *Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)*, pages 1207–1214. **Acceptance rate: 34%**, Morgan Kaufmann, 2007.
 19. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. In *Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS)*, volume 4393 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*, pages 212–223. **Acceptance rate: 15%**, Springer-Verlag, 2007.
 18. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and Y. Shoham. A game-theoretic analysis of strictly competitive multiagent scenarios. In *Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)*, pages 1199–1206. **Oral presentation acceptance rate: 15%**, Morgan Kaufmann, 2007.
 17. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. The computational complexity of choice sets. In *Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK)*, pages 82–91. **Oral presentation acceptance rate: 22%**, ACM Press, 2007.
 16. F. Brandt and F. Fischer. PageRank as a weak tournament solution. In *Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE)*, volume 4858 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*, pages 300–305. **Short paper acceptance rate: 66%**, Springer-Verlag, 2007.
 15. F. Brandt and F. Fischer. Computational aspects of covering in dominance graphs. In *Proceedings of the 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*, pages 694–699. **Oral presentation acceptance rate: 27%**, AAAI Press, 2007.
 14. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and Y. Shoham. On strictly competitive multi-player games. In *Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*, pages 605–612. **Oral presentation acceptance rate: 22%**, AAAI Press, 2006.

13. F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. Unconditional privacy in social choice. In *Proceedings of the 10th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK)*, pages 207–218. **Acceptance rate: 32%**, ACM Press, 2005.
12. F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. On correctness and privacy in distributed mechanisms. In *Revised selected papers from the 7th AAMAS Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC)*, volume 3937 of *Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI)*, pages 212–225, **Acceptance rate: 37%**, 2005.
11. F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. Efficient privacy-preserving protocols for multi-unit auctions. In *Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC)*, volume 3570 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*, pages 298–312. **Acceptance rate: 24%**, Springer-Verlag, 2005.
10. F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy. In *Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 357–364. **Acceptance rate: 24%**, ACM Press, 2005.
9. F. Brandt. Efficient cryptographic protocol design based on distributed El Gamal encryption. In *Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology (ICISC)*, volume 3935 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*, pages 32–47. **Acceptance rate: 18%**, Springer-Verlag, 2005.
8. F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. (Im)possibility of unconditionally privacy-preserving auctions. In *Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, pages 810–817. **Acceptance rate: 24%**, IEEE Computer Society Press, 2004.
7. F. Brandt. Social choice and preference protection - Towards fully private mechanism design. In *Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC)*, pages 220–221. **Short paper acceptance rate: 50%**, ACM Press, 2003.
6. F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In *Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC)*, volume 2742 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*, pages 223–238. **Acceptance rate: 32%**, Springer-Verlag, 2003.
5. F. Brandt and G. Weiß. Vicious strategies for Vickrey auctions. In *Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Autonomous Agents*, pages 71–72. **Short paper acceptance rate: 31%**, ACM Press, 2001.
4. F. Brandt and G. Weiß. Antisocial agents and Vickrey auctions. In *Intelligent Agents VIII*, volume 2333 of *Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI)*, pages 335–347. **Acceptance rate: 45%**, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
3. F. Brandt. Cryptographic protocols for secure second-price auctions. In *Cooperative Information Agents V*, volume 2182 of *Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI)*, pages 154–165. **Acceptance rate: 40%**, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
2. F. Brandt, W. Brauer, and G. Weiß. Task assignment in multiagent systems based on Vickrey-type auctioning and leveled commitment contracting. In *Cooperative Information Agents IV*, volume 1860 of *Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI)*, pages 95–106. **Acceptance rate: 32%**, Springer-Verlag, 2000.
1. S. Schulz and F. Brandt. Using term space maps to capture search control knowledge in equational theorem proving. In *Proceedings of the 12th Florida Artificial Intelligence*

Research Society Conference (FLAIRS), pages 244–248. **Acceptance rate: 50%**, AAAI Press, 1999.

Refereed Articles in Informal Proceedings

17. F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, and M. Suderland. Majority graphs of assignment problems and properties of popular random assignments. In *Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC)*, 2016.
16. F. Brandt, C. Geist, and M. Strobel. Analyzing the practical relevance of voting paradoxes via Ehrhart theory, computer simulations, and empirical data. In *Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC)*, 2016.
15. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Geist. Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving. In *Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC)*, 2016.
14. F. Brandt and H. G. Seedig. On the discriminative power of tournament solutions. In *Proceedings of the 1st AAMAS Workshop on Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in Computational Social Choice (EXPLORE)*, 2014.
13. F. Brandt, C. Geist, and H. G. Seedig. Identifying k -majority digraphs via SAT solving. In *Proceedings of the 1st AAMAS Workshop on Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in Computational Social Choice (EXPLORE)*, 2014.
12. F. Brandt, M. Brill, and P. Harrenstein. Extending tournament solutions. In *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics (ISAIM)*, 2014.
11. F. Brandt and M. Brill. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of irresolute social choice functions. In *Proceedings of the IJCAI Workshop on Social Choice and Artificial Intelligence*, 2011.
10. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. Pareto optimality in coalition formation. In *Proceedings of the IJCAI Workshop on Social Choice and Artificial Intelligence*, 2011.
9. F. Brandt, M. Brill, and H. G. Seedig. On the fixed-parameter tractability of composition-consistent tournament solutions. In *Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC)*, 2010.
8. F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. In *Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC)*, 2010.
7. F. Brandt. Group-strategyproof irresolute social choice functions. In *Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC)*, 2010.
6. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games. In *Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC)*, pages 271–282, 2010.
5. F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Dominance in social choice and coalitional game theory. In *Proceedings of the 8th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT)*, 2008.

4. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair. A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. In *Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC)*, 2008.
3. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. The computational complexity of choice sets. In *Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC)*, 2006.
2. F. Brandt, T. Sandholm, and Y. Shoham. Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions. In *Proceedings of the 7th IJCAI Workshop on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents (GTDT)*, 2005.
1. F. Brandt. A verifiable, bidder-resolved auction protocol. In *Proceedings of the 5th AAMAS Workshop on Deception, Fraud and Trust in Agent Societies (Special Track on Privacy and Protection with Multi-Agent Systems)*, 2002.

Other Publications

33. F. Brandt and W. S. Zwicker, editors. *Special Issue on Computational Foundations of Social Choice, Mathematical Social Sciences*, 64(1), 2012.
32. F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, L. A. Hemaspaandra, J.-F. Laslier, and W. S. Zwicker, editors. *Computational Foundations of Social Choice*. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 10101, LZI, 2010.
31. F. Brandl and F. Brandt. Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences and pairwise utilitarianism. Technical report, <https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.05519>, 2017.
30. H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, M. Olsen, and D. Peters. Fractional hedonic games. Technical report, <https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.10116>, 2017.
29. F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters. Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.08063>, 2016.
28. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Geist. Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/1604.05692>, 2016.
27. F. Brandt. Computational social choice (Invited tutorial). In *Proceedings of the 32nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS)*, Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), page 19. LZI, 2015.
26. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Consistent probabilistic social choice. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/1503.00694>, 2015.
25. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. Welfare maximization entices participation. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.03538>, 2015.
24. F. Brandt, M. Brill, and W. Suksompong. An ordinal minimax theorem. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.4198>, 2014.
23. F. Brandt and H. G. Seedig. A tournament of order 24 with two disjoint TEQ-retentive sets. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/1302.5592>, 2013.
22. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/1304.3169>, 2013.

21. F. Brandt. Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.4877>, 2011.
20. F. Brandt. From Arrow's impossibility to Schwartz's tournament equilibrium set (Invited tutorial). In *Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Relational and Algebraic Methods in Computer Science*, volume 6663 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*, pages 50–51. Springer-Verlag, 2011.
19. F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing combinatorial protections: Polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates. Technical Report UR CSD / TR955, University of Rochester, 2010.
18. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.4540>, 2010.
17. F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.3580>, 2009.
16. F. Brandt. *Tournament Solutions – Extensions of Maximality and Their Applications to Decision-Making*. Habilitation Thesis, Faculty for Mathematics, Computer Science, and Statistics, University of Munich, 2009.
15. D. Baumeister, F. Brandt, F. Fischer, J. Hoffmann, and J. Rothe. The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/0901.3692>, 2009.
14. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. On iterated dominance, matrix elimination, and matched paths. Technical Report TR08-077, Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), 2008.
13. F. Brandt. Minimal stable sets in tournaments. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/0803.2138>, 2008.
12. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries. Technical Report TR07-136, Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), 2007.
11. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and P. Harrenstein. Recognizing members of the Tournament Equilibrium set is NP-hard. Technical report, <http://arxiv.org/abs/0711.2961>, 2007.
10. F. Brandt, F. Fischer, and M. Holzer. Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. Technical Report TR06-091, Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), 2006.
9. F. Brandt, T. Sandholm, and Y. Shoham. Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions. In *Computing and Markets*, number 05011 in Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings. Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany, 2005.
8. F. Brandt. Private public choice. Technical Report FKI-247-03, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich (TUM), 2003. ISSN 0941-6358.
7. F. Brandt. *Fundamental Aspects of Privacy and Deception in Electronic Auctions*. Doctoral Thesis, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich, 2003.
6. F. Brandt. Secure and private auctions without auctioneers. Technical Report FKI-245-02, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich (TUM), 2002. ISSN 0941-6358.

5. F. Brandt and G. Weiß. Exploring auction-based leveled commitment contracting. Part III: Vickrey-type auctioning. Technical Report FKI-238-00, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich (TUM), 2000. ISSN 0941-6358.
4. F. Brandt and G. Weiß. Exploring auction-based leveled commitment contracting. Part II: Dutch-type auctioning. Technical Report FKI-237-00, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich (TUM), 2000. ISSN 0941-6358.
3. F. Brandt. Antisocial bidding in repeated Vickrey auctions. Technical Report FKI-241-00, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich (TUM), 2000. ISSN 0941-6358.
2. F. Brandt and G. Weiß. Exploring auction-based leveled commitment contracting. Part I: English-type auctioning. Technical Report FKI-234-99, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich (TUM), 1999. ISSN 0941-6358.
1. F. Brandt. Example selection for learning in automated theorem proving. Diploma Thesis, Department for Computer Science, Technical University of Munich, 1998.

Program Committee Memberships

ACM EC	ACM Conference on Economics and Computation: 2017 <i>Senior PC</i> (Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA), 2016 <i>Senior PC</i> (Maastricht, The Netherlands), 2014 <i>Senior PC</i> and <i>Chair of Best Paper Award Committee</i> (Palo Alto, USA), 2013 (Philadelphia, USA), 2011 <i>Senior PC</i> (San Jose, USA), 2010 (Boston, USA), 2008 (Chicago, USA), 2007 (San Diego, USA)
IJCAI	International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence: 2018 <i>Senior PC</i> (Stockholm, Sweden), 2017 (Melbourne, Australia), 2016 <i>Senior PC</i> (New York City, USA), 2015 <i>Senior PC</i> (Buenos Aires, Argentina), 2013 <i>Senior PC</i> (Beijing, China), 2011 <i>Senior PC</i> (Barcelona, Spain), 2009 (Pasadena, USA)
AAMAS	International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: 2018 <i>Area Chair</i> (Stockholm, Sweden), 2016 (Singapore), 2015 (Istanbul, Turkey), 2012 <i>Senior PC</i> (Valencia, Spain), 2009 (Budapest, Hungary), 2008 <i>Senior PC</i> (Estoril, Portugal), 2007 (Honolulu, USA), 2006 (Hakodate, Japan)
COMSOC	International Workshop on Computational Social Choice: 2016 (Toulouse, France), 2014 (Pittsburgh, USA), 2012 (Krakow, Poland), 2010 (Düsseldorf, Germany), 2008 (Liverpool, UK)
AAAI	AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence: 2010 <i>Senior PC</i> (Atlanta, USA), 2008 (Chicago, USA), 2007 (Vancouver, USA),
SAGT	International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory: 2018 (Beijing, China), 2015 (Saarbrücken, Germany), 2013 (Aachen, Germany), 2009 (Paphos, Cyprus),
SCW	Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare: 2014 (Boston, USA), 2012 (New Delhi, India)
EXPLORE	Workshop on Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in Computational Social Choice: 2016 (Singapore), 2014 (Paris, France)
CEC	International IEEE Conference on E-Commerce Technology: 2005 (Munich, Germany), 2004 (San Diego, USA)

ADT	International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory: 2015 (Kentucky, USA)
PRIMA	International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems: 2015 (Bertinoro, Italy)
STACS	International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science: 2012 (Paris, France)
VoteID	International Conference on E-Voting and Identity: 2011 (Tallinn, Estonia)
RAMiCS	International Conference on Relational and Algebraic Methods in Computer Science: 2011 (Rotterdam, The Netherlands)
ECAI	European Conference on Artificial Intelligence: 2010 (Lisbon, Portugal)
TARK	Biennial Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge: 2009 (Palo Alto, USA)
SOFSEM	International Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science (Special Track on Game Theoretic Aspects of E-Commerce): 2009 (Špindlerův Mlýn, Czech Republic)
CIA	International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents: 2008 (Prague, Czech Republic)
M-PREF	Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling: 2008 (Montpellier, France)
WINE	International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics: 2007 (San Diego, USA)
EUMAS	European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems: 2007 (Hammamet, Tunisia)
AMEC	International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: 2007 (Honolulu, USA)
CISC	SKLOIS Conference on Information Security and Cryptology: 2005 (Beijing, China)
FLAIRS	Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference: 2002 (Pensacola Beach, USA)

Refereeing: Research Funding Organizations and Universities

Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung (AvH), Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), European Research Council (ERC), European Science Foundation (ESF) College of Expert Reviewers, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel Science Foundation (ISF), MacArthur Foundation, National Science Foundation (NSF), Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO), Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, Österreichischer Akademischer Austauschdienst (OeAD), Oxford University, Servizio Ricerca Università della Svizzera italiana et Scuola universitaria professionale della Svizzera italiana (USI), University of Auckland, U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF)

Refereeing: Journals

Annals of Operations Research, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Artificial Intelligence, Discrete Applied Mathematics, Data & Knowledge Engineering, Decision Support Systems, Discrete Mathematics, Econometrica, Economics Bulletin,

Economic Theory, Fundamenta Informaticae, Games & Economic Behavior, Information Processing Letters, INFORMS Journal on Computing, International Journal of Game Theory, International Journal of Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence, Journal of AI Research, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Logic and Computation, Journal of Systems and Software, Journal of Zhejiang University Science, Mathematical Social Sciences, Mathematics of Operations Research, Operations Research, Public Choice, Research in Economics, SIAM Journal on Computing, Social Choice and Welfare, Theoretical Computer Science, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, Wirtschaftsinformatik

Refereeing: Conferences

30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2016), 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2011), 3rd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2010), 27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2010), 34th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 2007), 24th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2007), 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2007), 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2005), 6th Annual ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC 2005), 25th German Conference on Artificial Intelligence (KI 2002), 15th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2002), 19th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2002), 5th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents (CIA 2001)

Third-Party Funding

December 2017	Collective Choice Lotteries: Dealing with Randomization in Voting, Matching, and Allocation Principal investigator, funded by DFG grant BR 2312/12-1 Volume: € 1,220,000
August 2015	An Axiomatic and Computational Study of Probabilistic Social Choice Principal investigator, funded by DFG grant BR 2312/11-1 Volume: € 502,408
September 2011	Algorithmische Grundlagen der Social-Choice-Theorie Principal investigator, funded by DFG grant BR 2312/10-1 Joint project with Jörg Rothe (University of Düsseldorf), national follow-up to BR 2312/6-1 Total volume: € 656,200, Individual volume: € 328,100
March 2011	Preferences over Sets in Coalition Formation and Strategic Voting Principal investigator, funded by DFG grant BR 2312/9-1 Volume: € 213,600
October 2009	Algorithmic Game Theory Heisenberg Professorship, funded by DFG grants BR 2312/7-1 and BR 2312/7-2 Volume: € 489,600
June 2008	Computational Foundations of Social Choice Leading coordinator and principal investigator, coordinated by ESF (European Sci-

ence Foundation), funded by DFG (German Research Foundation), ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council), ISF (Israel Science Foundation), NWO (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek), NSF (National Science Foundation), TÜBİTAK (Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu), grant BR 2312/6-1

Participants: Ulle Endriss (University of Amsterdam), Jeffrey Rosenschein (Hebrew University, Jerusalem), Jörg Rothe (University of Düsseldorf), Remzi Sanver (Istanbul Bilgi University), Vincent Conitzer (Duke University, Durham), Edith Elkind (University of Southampton), Edith Hemaspaandra (Rochester Institute of Technology), Lane Hemaspaandra (University of Rochester), Jérôme Lang (Université Paul Sabatier, Paris), Jean-François Laslier (École Polytechnique, Paris), Nicolas Maudet (Université Paris-Dauphine)

Total volume: € 1,689,206, Individual volume: € 478,850

January 2005

Preference Aggregation in Multiagent Systems

Principal investigator, funded by DFG grants BR 2312/3-1, BR 2312/3-2, and BR 2312/3-3

Volume: € 1,010,273

August 2003

The Design of Secure Public Choice Protocols

Research stipend, funded by DFG grant BR 2312/1-1

Volume: € 67,408

Miscellaneous

DFG Reinhart Koselleck Project: grant for innovative, high-risk research (2017–)

First DFG Heisenberg Professorship in computer science: award containing funds for establishing new professorship (2010–2015)

DFG Aktionsplan Informatik (Emmy Noether program): young investigator award containing funds for research group (2005–2010)

Elected member of the Council of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (2016–2021)

Secondary appointment at TUM Department of Mathematics (since 2012)

Program co-chair (jointly with H. Aziz, D. Manlove, and N. Mattei) of EXPLORE 2016 (May 2016)

Program co-chair (jointly with P. Faliszewski) of COMSOC 2012 (September 2012)

Steering Committee Member for COMSOC Workshop Series (2012–2016)

Co-Organizer (jointly with V. Conitzer, L. Hemaspaandra, J.-F. Laslier, and W. Zwicker) of Dagstuhl-Seminar “Computational Foundations of Social Choice” (March 2010)

Participant of ICT COST Action IC1205 on “Computational Social Choice” (2012–2016)

Best paper award nomination AAMAS 2016 (4 out of 550 submissions)

Best paper award nomination AAMAS 2010 (3 out of 685 submissions)

Best student paper award (ATAL 2001)

TUM TeachInf Award 2014 for “Computational Social Choice” (Best elective course in computer science)

Panelist: “The Future of Negotiation” (ATAL 2001)

3rd place at CASC-15, Unit Equality Division (CADE ATP (Automated Theorem Prover) System Competition) (July 1998)

ParisTech research scholarship “Tournament Solutions” (joint proposal with Markus Brill and Jean-François Laslier)

Blog “Turing’s invisible hand” (jointly with Michal Feldmann, Jason Hartline, Bobby Kleinberg, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Noam Nisan, and Vijay Vazirani)

Selected Talks

- May 2017 “Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice” (Invited Talk, 5th Annual Workshop “Decision: Theory, Experiments and Applications”, Paris, France)
- February 2017 “On the Tradeoff Between Efficiency and Strategyproofness” (Keynote, 4th Day on Computational Game Theory, Zurich, Switzerland)
- February 2017 “Economics and Computation” (Invited Tutorial, Center for Doctoral Studies in Informatics and its Applications, TUM)
- January 2017 “Probabilistic Social Choice” (Invited Talk, Workshop on Decision Making and Contest Theory, Ein Gedi, Israel)
- December 2016 “Fishburn’s Maximal Lotteries” (Invited Talk, Workshop on Mechanism Design, Singapore)
- December 2016 “On the Tradeoff between Efficiency and Strategyproofness” (Computer Science Seminar, National University of Singapore)
- October 2016 “Computational Social Choice” (Invited Tutorial, Autumn School on Computational Social Choice and Fair Division, St. Petersburg, Russia)
- July 2016 “On the Tradeoff Between Efficiency and Strategyproofness” (5th World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Maastricht, The Netherlands)
- November 2015 “Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice” (Algorithms Seminar, Oxford University, UK)
- June 2015 “Fishburn’s Maximal Lotteries: A randomized rule that is immune to splitting electorates, cloning alternatives, abstention, and crude manipulation” (Dagstuhl Seminar “Computational Social Choice: Theory and Applications”), Germany
- March 2015 “Computational Social Choice” (Invited Tutorial, 32nd Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2015), Munich, Germany)
- February 2015 “Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice” (Micro-Theory Seminar, University of Glasgow, UK)
- June 2014 “Consistent Social Choice Lotteries” (12th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Boston, USA)
- June 2014 “Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: From Arrow’s Impossibility to Fishburn’s Maximal Lotteries” (Tutorial, 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC 2014), Palo Alto, USA)

- November 2013 “The Tradeoff between Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice” (Dagstuhl-Seminar “Electronic Markets and Auctions”, Germany)
- October 2013 “Consistent Social Choice Lotteries” (Keynote, Workshop on Mathematics of Electoral Systems: Voting, Apportioning and Districting, Budapest, Hungary)
- November 2012 “Consistent Social Choice Lotteries” (Invited Talk, 6th Seminar on Ordered Structures in Games and Decisions, Paris, France)
- March 2012 “The Tale of the Tournament Equilibrium Set” (Dagstuhl-Seminar “Computation and Incentives in Social Choice”, Germany)
- September 2011 “Computational Foundations of Social Choice” (ESF LogICCC Final Conference, Berlin, Germany)
- May 2011 “From Arrow’s Impossibility to Schwartz’s Tournament Equilibrium Set” (Invited Tutorial, 12th International Conference on Relational and Algebraic Methods in Computer Science (RAMiCS 2011), Rotterdam, The Netherlands)
- September 2010 “Tournament Solutions and Their Applications to Multiagent Decision Making” (Invited Talk, 8th German Conference on Multi-Agent System Technologies (MATES 2010), Leipzig, Germany)
- July 2010 “Mini-Course: Computational Social Choice” (Invited Tutorial, Doctorate program “Program and Model Analysis”, Munich, Germany)
- April 2010 “From Arrow’s Impossibility to Schwartz’s Tournament Equilibrium Set” (Invited Talk, COST-ADT Doctoral School on Computational Social Choice, Estoril, Portugal)
- January 2010 “Set-Rationalizable Choice and Self-Stability” (Invited Talk, Workshop on Choice Theory, Paris, France)
- June 2009 “Tournament Solutions” (Invited Talk, Workshop on Preference Handling and Aggregation in Combinatorial Domains, Paris, France)
- October 2008 “Computational Foundations of Social Choice” (ESF LogICCC Launch Conference, Prague, Czech Republic)
- July 2008 “Computational Properties of Quasi-Strict Equilibrium” (3rd World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Evanston, USA)
- June 2008 “Minimal Stable Sets in Tournaments” (9th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Montréal, Canada)
- December 2007 “Computing the Minimal Covering Set” (Stanford University, Palo Alto, USA)
- October 2007 “The Computational Complexity of Tournament Solutions” (Dagstuhl-Seminar “Computational Issues in Social Choice”, Germany)
- June 2007 “Computational Aspects of Covering in Dominance Graphs” (5th International Conference on Logic, Game Theory, and Social Choice, Bilbao, Spain)
- January 2007 “How to Aggregate Preferences Without Revealing Them” (Invited Talk, School of Computer and Communication Sciences, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland)
- January 2007 “Preference Aggregation in Multiagent Systems” (Invited Talk, Institute of Applied Informatics and Formal Description Methods, University of Karlsruhe, Germany)

November 2006	“Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions” (INFORMS Annual Meeting 2006, Pittsburgh, USA)
July 2006	“Spieltheorie in der Informatik” (Tag der Informatiklehrer, Munich, Germany)
July 2006	“Symmetries and Efficient Solvability in Multi-Player Games” (17th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, USA)
July 2006	“On Strictly Competitive Multi-Player Games” (17th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, USA)
November 2005	“How to Aggregate Preferences Without Revealing Them” (Invited Talk, International Doctoral Graduate School of Information Management and Market Engineering, University of Karlsruhe, Germany)
January 2005	“Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions” (Dagstuhl-Seminar “Computing and Markets”, Germany)
August 2002	“Kryptographische Protokolle für sichere Auktionen” (Invited Talk, German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI), Saarbrücken, Germany)

Teaching

2017–2018	Course “Einführung in die Informatik 1” (jointly with H. Räcke, including practical course)
2016–	Seminar “Markets, Algorithms, Incentives, and Networks”
2015–	Seminar “Computational Social Choice”
2011–	Course “Algorithmic Game Theory” (including exercise course)
2011–	Seminar “Economics and Computation”
2007–	Course “Computational Social Choice” (including exercise course)
2006–	Seminar “Multiagent Systems”
2010–2011	Course “Gems of Computer Science III”
2008–2009	Course “Algorithmische Graphentheorie” (jointly with J. Johannsen, including exercise course)
2007	Course “Multiagentensysteme” (including exercise course)
2006	Seminar “Spieltheorie”
2002–2003	Exercise course “Diskrete Strukturen I”
2002–2003	Seminar “Einführung in die Methoden der Künstlichen Intelligenz”
2001–2002	Exercise course “Diskrete Strukturen I” (TA)
2001	Exercise course “Einführung in die Informatik IV” (TA)
2000–2001	Seminar “Agenten in der Informatik”
1999–2001	Exercise course “Einführung in die Informatik III” (TA)
1999–2003	Seminar “UNIX-Tools”

PhD Student Supervision

- 06/2017– Stricker, Christian (mathematics)
- 05/2016– Saile, Christian (mathematics)
- 07/2014– Hofbauer, Johannes (mathematics)
- 10/2013– Brandl, Florian (mathematics)
- 01/2013–04/2016 Geist, Christian (computer science): “Generating Insights in Social Choice Theory via Computer-aided Methods” (Committee members: Prof. Javier Esparza (chair), Prof. Felix Brandt, Prof. Tobias Nipkow)
- 03/2010–02/2015 Seedig, Hans Georg (computer science): “Majority Relations and Tournament Solutions – A Computational Study” (Committee members: Prof. Harald Räcke (chair), Prof. Felix Brandt, Prof. Rolf Niedermeier)
- 10/2008–11/2012 Brill, Markus (computer science): “Set-Valued Solution Concepts in Social Choice and Game Theory – Axiomatic and Computational Aspects” (Committee members: Prof. Tobias Nipkow (chair), Prof. Felix Brandt, Prof. Jérôme Lang)
Bund der Freunde der TUM Dissertation Award 2013, Honorable Mention Artificial Intelligence Dissertation Award 2013 (ECCAI), nominated for National Best Dissertation in Computer Science Award 2013 (GI), Feodor Lynen Fellowship 2013 (AvH), Emmy Noether Fellowship 2017 (DFG)
Academic appointments after graduation: post-doc (Duke University), post-doc (Oxford University)
- 10/2005–07/2009 Fischer, Felix (computer science): “Complexity Results for some Classes of Strategic Games” (Committee members: Prof. Martin Hofmann (chair), Prof. Lane Hemaspaandra, Priv.-Doz. Martin Lange, Prof. Martin Schottenloher)
Academic appointments after graduation: post-doc (Harvard University), lecturer (University of Cambridge)

External PhD Student Supervision

- 2014–2017 Warut Suksompong (MIT, Stanford University), four visits
- 2015–2017 Dominik Peters (Oxford University), three visits

Student Supervision

- 03/2017–07/2017 Dominik Spies: “A Tool for Random Assignment” (Bachelor thesis, advisor: Johannes Hofbauer)
- 11/2016–04/2017 Stefan Tilly: “An Axiomatic Study of Parameterized Maximal Lottery Schemes” (Master thesis, advisor: Florian Brandl)
- 08/2016–08/2017 Antonia Schmalstieg: “Shapley’s Saddles in Restricted Classes of Games” (Master thesis, advisor: Johannes Hofbauer)
- 04/2016–11/2016 Maxi Weininger: “Acceptability of Social Choice Lotteries” (Interdisciplinary project, advisor: Florian Brandl)
- 02/2016–09/2016 Stefan Heidekrüger: “Bidding Strategies and Market Price Prediction in Real-time Computational Display Advertising” (Master thesis, advisor: Martin Bichler)

- 04/2016–09/2016 Michael Engesser: “Tie-breaking for Popular Random Assignments” (Master thesis, advisor: Johannes Hofbauer)
- 03/2016–09/2016 Manuel Eberl: “A Formal Proof of the Incompatibility of SD-Efficiency and SD-Strategy-Proofness” (Bachelor thesis, advisor: Christian Geist)
- 10/2015–05/2017 Stricker, Christian: “How Frequently Do Social Decision Schemes Violate Desirable Properties?” (Master thesis, advisor: Florian Brandl)
- 05/2015–12/2015 Suderland, Martin: “Popular Random Assignments” (Master thesis, advisor: Johannes Hofbauer)
- 04/2015–09/2015 Keinholz, Jonas: “Formalization of Gibbard’s random dictatorship theorem in Isabelle/HOL” (Bachelor thesis, advisor: Johannes Hölzl)
- 02/2015–11/2015 Strobel, Martin: “A Quantitative Study of the Axiomatic Properties of Selected Voting Rules” (Master thesis, advisor: Christian Geist)
- 01/2015–12/2015 Havemann, Robert: “Farsighted Stability Notions in Coalition Formation Games” (Master thesis, advisor: Florian Brandl)
- 10/2014–05/2015 Dierks, Ludwig: “Cooperative Games with Payoff Restrictions” (Master thesis, advisor: Johannes Hofbauer)
- 04/2014–09/2014 Chabin, Guillaume: “Pnyx: A Tool for Preference Aggregation” (Interdisciplinary project, advisor: Christian Geist)
- 04/2014–11/2014 Turchetta, Stefano: “Payoff Query Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Games” (Master thesis, co-advised by Paul Goldberg (Oxford University))
- 04/2014–09/2014 Strobel, Martin: “Fractional Hedonic Games – Individual and Group Stability Notions” (Bachelor thesis, advisor: Florian Brandl)
- 11/2013–07/2014 von Wedel, Jana Karina: “Agents’ Optimal Strategies for Deferred Acceptance Algorithms” (Master thesis, advisor: Hans Georg Seedig)
- 11/2013–07/2014 Bachmeier, Georg: “Majority Relations for a Constant Number of Voters” (Interdisciplinary project, advisor: Hans Georg Seedig)
- 11/2013–04/2014 Bay, Michael: “Answer Set Programming for Computer-aided Theorem Proving in Social Choice Theory” (Bachelor thesis, advisor: Christian Geist)
- 10/2013–05/2014 Hofbauer, Johannes: “Participation Conditions for Irresolute Social Choice Functions and Social Decision Schemes” (Master thesis)
- 09/2013–05/2014 Kokott, Giani: “Game Theoretic Analysis of Individual Bidding Behavior in Multi-Object Auctions” (Master thesis, advisor: Per Paulsen)
- 05/2013–09/2013 Brandl, Florian: “Efficiency and Incentives in Randomized Social Choice” (Master thesis)
- 05/2013–03/2014 Kardel, Keyvan: “Participation and Group-Participation in Social Choice Theory” (Master thesis)
- 04/2013–12/2013 Brändle, Elisabeth: “Constraint Satisfaction Programming for Computer-aided Theorem Proving in Social Choice Theory” (Master thesis, advisor: Christian Geist)
- 03/2013–08/2013 Reiter, Markus: “A Scoring Method for Tournaments Based on Minimal Gain Scores” (Bachelor thesis, advisor: Markus Brill)

- 03/2013–09/2013 Schmalstieg, Antonia: “Markov Chains and Social Decision Schemes” (Bachelor thesis, advisor: Markus Brill)
- 03/2013–06/2013 Röhner, Kilian: “Payment Optimization” (Interdisciplinary project, advisor: Hans Georg Seedig)
- 02/2013–08/2013 Fischer, Thomas: “Approximation mechanisms for multi-object auctions” (Master thesis, advisor: Salman Fadaei)
- 04/2012–05/2013 Kardel, Keyvan: “On the Hardness of Voting With a Constant Number of Voters” (Interdisciplinary project, advisor: Hans Georg Seedig)
- 11/2011–05/2012 Louca, Lucas: “A Graphical Tool for Computing Shapley’s Saddles in Zero-Sum Games” (Master thesis, advisor: Markus Brill)
- 09/2011–03/2012 Kaul, Christian: “Voting Power in the German Bundestag” (Master thesis, advisor: Haris Aziz)
- 07/2011–09/2011 Frieden, Jutta: “Variants of the Stable Roommates Problem” (Bachelor thesis, advisor: Haris Aziz)
- 06/2011–08/2011 Brandl, Florian: “Existence of Stability in Hedonic Coalition Formation Games” (Bachelor thesis, advisor: Haris Aziz)
- 05/2011–09/2011 Dau, Andre: “Transitive Subtournaments and Set-Theoretic Relationships between Tournament Solutions” (Interdisciplinary project, advisor: Hans Georg Seedig)
- 01/2010–08/2010 Mielchen, Sonja: “Mechanism Design in Hedonic Games” (Diploma thesis, advisor: Paul Harrenstein)
- 04/2008–10/2008 Wassenberg, Philip: “Implementation and evaluation of cryptographic auction protocols” (Diploma thesis)
- 10/2007–07/2008 Waldemar, Eimund: “The computational complexity of Nash equilibria in games with few outcomes” (Diploma thesis)
- 10/2007–05/2009 Mair, Maximilian: “Implementing the tournament equilibrium set”
- 10/2007–11/2008 Bluhme, Sarah: “A graphical tool for computing tournament solutions” (Software development project)
- 09/2006–05/2007 Wassenberg, Philip: “Implementation of a cryptographic comparison-protocol” (Software development project)
- 07/2006–12/2006 Meier, Maximilian: “Computing Nash equilibria of normal-form games using support enumeration” (Software development project)
- 03/2002–09/2002 Chen, Willy: “Implementation and evaluation of a cryptographic auction protocol” (Software development project)

Hosted Post-Doctoral Researchers

- 04/2010–05/2012 Pyrga, Evangelia
- 09/2009–10/2012 Aziz, Haris
 IEEE’s AI Ten to Watch 2016, Julius Career Award 2016, Chris Wallace Award for Outstanding Research 2017
 Subsequent academic appointment: researcher (NICTA (now Data61) and University of New South Wales)

02/2009–12/2009 Sørensen, Troels Bjerre

Subsequent academic appointments: research fellow (University of Warwick), post-doc (Duke University)

02/2006–09/2012 Harrenstein, Paul

Subsequent academic appointment: research assistant (Oxford University)

Munich, January 25, 2018