Plan for Today

• Introduction
• Organization of the seminar
• Papers
  ▸ matching theory
  ▸ voting theory
  ▸ other
• Registration
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in topics at the intersection of economics and computer science, as witnessed by the rapid rise of research areas such as algorithmic game theory and computational social choice.

This development is due to the emergence of computational networks such as the Internet as well as the need to get a grip on algorithmic questions in economics.

The emphasis in this seminar lies on the independent study of classic economics papers as well as more recent papers from computer science. Among the topics to be covered are matching theory, mechanism design, and voting theory.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Talks</th>
<th>Room</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 27</td>
<td>15.00 - 16.00</td>
<td>(kick off)</td>
<td>01.10.011</td>
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<tr>
<td>tba</td>
<td>tba</td>
<td>(first meeting)</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 13</td>
<td>14.00 - 17.00</td>
<td>1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>01.12.035</td>
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<td>June 20</td>
<td>14.00 - 17.00</td>
<td>3 &amp; 4</td>
<td>01.10.011</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 4</td>
<td>14.00 - 17.00</td>
<td>5 &amp; 6</td>
<td>01.10.011</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 11</td>
<td>14.00 - 17.00</td>
<td>7 &amp; 8</td>
<td>01.10.011</td>
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Rough Schedule

• First stint
  ‣ talk (30-45 min)
  ‣ feedback (5-10 min)
  ‣ discussions (10-20 min)

• Break

• Second stint
  ‣ talk
  ‣ feedback
  ‣ discussions
In order to pass you need to...

- attend all meetings
  - you may be absent once if you have a good reason
- write an abstract for your talk/topic
- give a good talk
- read the abstracts by your peers before the talk
  - prepare questions
- participate in discussions
- chair a session
Do I have to meet my supervisor?

- No, but we recommend it
  - 3 weeks before talk: discuss general plan of abstract & talk
  - 1 week before talk: send slides (if you plan to use slides)
  - you are the expert on your paper!
Matching

• A. Abdulkadiroğlu and T. Sönmez. School choice: A mechanism design approach.
• A. Abdulkadiroğlu and T. Sönmez. House allocation with existing tenants.
• A. Bogomolnaia and M. O. Jackson. The stability of hedonic coalition structures.
• A. Bogomolnaia and H. Moulin. A new solution to the random assignment problem.
Voting

- J. Bartholdi, III, C. A. Tovey, and M. A. Trick. The computational difficulty of manipulating an election.
- V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, and J. Lang. When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
- J. Duggan and T. Schwartz. Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs.
- A. Gibbard. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance.
- M. D. Intriligator. A probabilistic model of social choice.
- H. Moulin. Choosing from a tournament.
- H. P. Young. Optimal voting rules.
Other

- S. J. Brams and A. D. Taylor. *An envy-free cake division protocol.*
- M. O. Jackson and A. Wolinsky. *A strategic model of social and economic networks.*
- N. Nisan and A. Ronen. *Algorithmic mechanism design.*
- T. Roughgarden and É. Tardos. *How bad is selfish routing?*
Registration

• Email to brill@in.tum.de
  ‣ name, background, motivation (up to 250 words)
  ‣ 2-5 papers you are interested in

• Deadline: February 1, 2012, 11:59pm
  ‣ notifications until February 5

• Seminar homepage:
  ‣ http://dss.in.tum.de/teaching/ss-12/126-ec2012.html