Lecture and Tutorials in WS 16/17
Computational Social Choice (IN2229)
- Lecture: Tuesdays, 13.15 - 15.45, room 01.10.011 (first lecture: 25 Oct 2016)
- Tutorial: Mondays, 16.30 - 18.00, room 01.10.011 (first tutorial: 7 Nov 2016)
- SWS: 3+2
- Credits: 6
- Registration: Via TUMonline
- Classification: "Formale Methoden und ihre Anwendungen" (FMA)
- Module decription: IN2229
- Language: English
- Exam: Wednesday, 17.30 - 19.30, 15 Feb 2017 (Interimshörsaal 2)
IMPORTANT NOTICE: This is a theory course. It is expected that participants are familiar with formal mathematics and standard proof techniques. Addtionally, basic knowledge about NP-completeness is useful (e.g., Module IN0011).
Social choice theory deals with the aggregation of individual preferences into a collective choice such as in voting. This course focusses on the analysis and comparison of aggregation functions that are based on simple majority rule. After introducing the mathematical and microeconomic foundations of social choice theory, particular attention will be paid to algorithmic aspects.
Tentative list of topics:
- Voting rules
- Rational choice theory (rationalizability, consistency)
- May's theorem
- Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Scoring rules
- Condorcet rules (Top cycle, Uncovered set, Banks set, Minimal covering set, Tournament equilibrium set, Kemeny-Young rule)
- McGarvey's theorem
- Computational complexity of voting rules
- Strategic manipulation (Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem)
Exercises are voluntary, but highly recommended. Each exercise sheet will contain tutorial exercises (T) and homework exercises (H). If you correctly solve at least 60 per cent of (H) exercises and pass the exam with a grade between 1.3 and 4.0, your final grade will be your exam grade minus 0.3 (for example, the grade 1.7 will be turned into 1.4).
Exercise sheets will be made available each Tuesday. They are due the following Monday at 16.00 (before the first tutorial begins). Submission is possible either via the chair's post box in the FMI basement (marked "Prof. Brandt") or at the beginning of the first tutorial.
There will be a written exam at the end of the semester, which will be graded according to the following grading scale:
- [0,5) points: 5,0
- [5,11) points: 4,7
- [11,17) points: 4,3
- [17,19] points: 4,0
- (19,22] points: 3,7
- (22,24] points: 3,3
- (24,26] points: 3,0
- (26,28] points: 2,7
- (28,30] points: 2,3
- (30,32] points: 2,0
- (32,34] points: 1,7
- (34,36] points: 1,3
- (36,40] points: 1,0
The only resource you may use during the exam are two hand-written sheets of DIN A4 paper that you prepared yourself (you may write on both sides of each sheet). In particular, electronic devices, books, photocopies, and printouts are disallowed.
The exam will be in English. If need be, answers in German are acceptable, too.
Please remember to bring your student id (or an equivalent photo id).
We will notify you by email when the grades are available in TUMonline.
There is no textbook that covers all the topics listed above. Lecture slides will be published on a weekly basis. The 2012 survey article below informally covers many topics of this course. You can learn more about computational social choice here.
- F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia. Handbook of Computational Social Choice, Cambridge University Press, 2016. (free PDF available, password: cam1CSC)
- F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, and U. Endriss. Computational Social Choice. In "Multiagent Systems" (G. Weiss, ed.), MIT Press, 2012.
- Y. Chevaleyre, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and N. Maudet. A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice. In Proceedings of the 33rd Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science (SOFSEM-2007), LNCS 4362, Springer-Verlag, 2007.
- P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems. In "Fundamental Problems in Computing: Essays in Honor of Professor Daniel J. Rosenkrantz" (S. Ravi and S. Shukla, eds.), Springer-Verlag, 2007.
Recommended advanced books:
- D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks: Positive Political Theory I, University of Michigan Press, 1999.
- M. R. Garey and D. S. Johnson. Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness. W. H. Freeman, 1979.
- W. Gärtner: A Primer in Social Choice Theory, Oxford University Press, 2009.
- J. Laslier. Tournament Solutions and Majority Voting. Springer-Verlag, 1997.
- H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- S. Nitzan. Collective Preference and Choice. Cambridge University Press, 2010
- A. Taylor. Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Computational Social Choice by Ulle Endriss, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Computational Social Choice by Lirong Xia, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA
- Algorithmische Eigenschaften von Wahlsystemen I by Jörg Rothe, Universität Düsseldorf, Germany